Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2006

Judicial Discretion to Condition
Thomas O. Main
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Main, Thomas O., "Judicial Discretion to Condition" (2006). Scholarly Works. 738.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/738

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
© 2006 TEMPLE UNIVERSITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH SYSTEM OF
HIGHER EDUCATION

WINTER 2006

VOL. 79 NO. 4

ARTICLES
JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO CONDITION
Thomas 0. Main*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The task of judging has been described as the art or science of making
discrete choices among competing courses of action.' Charged with the mandate
to administer justice fairly and equitably, judges are said to have discretion to
pursue any lawful course. 2 In both criminal and civil cases, and regarding matters
profound and trivial, the exercise of discretion is a core judicial function. 3 The
exercise of discretion is often characterized by vivid metaphors: judges confront

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. The author thanks Ron
Tochterman, Greg Pingree, and Kojo Yelpaala for their comments and ideas. The faculty at Florida
State University and at Pacific McGeorge also offered helpful feedback when the piece was presented
in colloquia.
1. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921) (analogizing
judicial decisions to free scientific research); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123-24 (1961)
(explaining judge's discretion to choose how closely, and in what manner, to follow authoritative
precedent); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 182 (1979)
(describing judicial process of filling gaps in law).
2. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 10 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989) ("The legal
question to which discretion is applied does not have one lawful solution, but rather several lawful
solutions."); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN

THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 144 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
("[D]iscretion means the power to chose between two or more courses of action each of which is
thought of as permissible.").
3. D. J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION 1

(Max Knight trans., 1967) (claiming that judicial discretion rivals in significance "the core of settled
rules in terms of which legal order is characterized").
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a frame of possibilities, 4 a zone, 5 a range, 6 a doughnut hole, 7 two paths or a fork
in the road,8 a fenced pasture. 9
Above all else, such metaphors convey that the exercise of discretion is
about choice.' 0 For example, under certain circumstances a judge hearing a
motion for a mistrial could have the discretion to grant or to deny the motion;
the judge could choose either of two paths. In other instances, there might be a
range of available courses of action from which to choose. For instance, upon a
motion to exclude, as cumulative, the testimony of four additional witnesses, the
judge could have discretion to exclude none, one, two, three, or all four
witnesses. Or the discretion in a given instance could be a function of two
determinants, such as when a sentencing range includes various combinations of
prison terms and probationary periods-a set of options that the fenced pasture
metaphor captures perhaps too well.
11
The adversarial process encourages litigants to take extreme positions,
and judges may be generally or somewhat persuaded by an advocate's argument
12
in support of a motion, yet prefer some intermediate or compromise position.
4. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 351 (1989) (utilizing term "frame" of possibilities); see
also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60-61 (1924) (describing that unfettered and

undirected judicial freedom does not exist, but that "[a] thousand limitations-the product some of
statute, some of precedent, some of vague tradition or of an immemorial technique,--encompass and
hedge us even when we think of ourselves as ranging freely and at large").
5. BARAK, supra note 2, at 9 ("[D]iscretion assumes a zone of possibilities.").
6. George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 747-48 (1986) (discussing
"range of choice" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
7. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1977) ("Discretion, like the hole in a
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is therefore
a relative concept.").
8. CARDOZO, supra note 4, at 59 ("There have been two paths, each open, though leading to
different goals. The fork in the road has not been neutralized .... ").
9. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretionof the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 635, 650 (1971) (describing discretion of trial court judge as a pasture the appellate judge may
fence off).
10. See Christie, supra note 6, at 747 ("It is universally accepted that discretion has something to
do with choice; beyond this, the consensus breaks down."); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 636 ("If the
word discretion conveys to legal minds any solid core of meaning, one central idea, above all others, it
is the idea of choice.").
11. Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and
Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 529 (1980)
("Adversary procedure may exacerbate rather than resolve tensions and may not foster the kind of
compromise essential to the restoration of harmony."); Roger J. Patterson, Dispute Resolution in a
World of Alternatives, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 591, 600 (1988) (noting propensity of adversary system to
drive parties to extreme positions); Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein, Towards a Theory of
Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 320 (1980) ("[T]he adversary
system introduces an unfortunate 'gaming' aspect to the judicial process that discourages the search
for 'win-win' solutions to a dispute .... ").
12. The obvious advantages find parallels in the justifications favoring alternative dispute
resolution, see, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing,in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65, 84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979)
(extolling benefits of dispute resolution process), voluntary cooperation and private settlements, see,
e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 4-6 (1983) (discussing historical dispute
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By conferring discretionary authority, the judicial system entrusts judges with the
ability to make sound and informed judgments about the relative merits of all
13
the various lawful courses of action that fall within the frame of possibilities.
The grant of authority is premised, first, on the notion that the trial judge is in
the superior position to see, hear, and evaluate the situation with firsthand
knowledge.' 4 A second (albeit less exalting) justification recognizes that
efficiency and finality in adjudication may be more important than accuracy in
every instance. 15 Judges are presumed to exercise their discretion in a fair and
neutral manner, and thus, the "abuse of discretion" standard of review insulates
16
certain exercises of discretion from rigorous reconsideration on appeal.
Metaphors notwithstanding, the exercise of judicial discretion does not
always involve a choice among discrete, identifiable options.' 7 Consider, for

resolution in communities), and plea bargaining, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) (preferring plea bargains and compromise over
litigation and conflict).
13. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 140-41.
14. Eric F. Spade, Note, A Mandatory Disclosureand Civil Justice Reform ProposalBased on the
Civil Justice Reform Act Experiments, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 180 (1995) (citing Ben F. Overton,
The Meaning of Judicial Discretion, in JUDICIAL DISCRETION 8 (National Judicial College, ABA
1991)).
15. See Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure,in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 72, 73 (1985)

(recognizing that right to greater accuracy is trade-off with cost while arguing that matters of principle
should trump considerations of policy in adjudication); Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the
Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1986) (reviewing Dworkin, supra) (stating that Dworkin's essay
"seems to undermine Dworkin's apparent view that in adjudication, rights should take precedence
over issues of public policy, such as administrative expedience"); Rosenburg, supra note 9, at 637
(discussing connection between prescribing degree of finality to lower courts' decisions and giving trial
court right to be wrong without reversal). See generally Larry Alexander, Are Procedural Rights
Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 LAW & PHIL. 19, 23-26 (1998) (stating that same considerations
governing private actions should govern procedural rights); Thomas C. Grey, ProceduralFairnessand
Substantive Rights, in NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS 182, 184 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman

eds., 1977) (stating that procedural fairness favors correct resolution of disputes, but only "at a cost
commensurate with what is at stake in the dispute"); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (comparing benefits of welfare economics with notions of
fairness).
16. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 716-19 (2d ed. 1996). Judicial discretion has
many meanings that extend beyond those invoking the abuse of discretion standard of review. See
MARISA IGLESIAS VILA, FACING JUDICIAL DISCRETION: LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND RIGHT ANSWERS

REVISITED 4-7 (2001) (defining four "senses" of judicial discretion).
17. The concept of choice has been widely developed in economic theory within the context of
rational action. The defining features of choice are: voluntariness, preferences, different real possible
courses of action, and mutually exclusive options. See, e.g., S. N. AFRIAT, LOGIC OF CHOICE AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (1987) (discussing "science of choice" in economics).
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example, the structural injunction; desegregating a school system, 18 reforming a
prison, 19 or disassembling a monopoly20 demands ingenuity and inventiveness,
rather than the wisdom to choose from among a finite set of options. 21 The
notion of so-called managerial judging presents another example; allocating
system resources efficiently and shepherding litigants through the process
expeditiously encourages proactive innovation. 22 Similarly, judicial exercise of
the authority to impose nonmonetary sanctions may require much creativity. 23 In
18. See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4 (1978) (describing judicial use of
injunction to restructure education systems).
19. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE

MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS 66-73 (1998) (considering
sweeping reforms ordered by Judge Henley in response to his characterization of prison system as
unconstitutional); Ronald J. Krotosyznski, Jr., EqualJustice Under Law: The JurisprudentialLegacy of
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. 1237, 1242-43 (2000) (describing and citing examples of
Judge Johnson's supervision of Alabama prisons and mental hospitals through long-term structural
injunctions).
20. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (assessing remedial options and order for divestiture in United States v.
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust
Divestiture: The Path Less Traveled, 86 MINN. L. REV. 565, 566 (2002) (discussing divestiture as
remedy in Microsoft case).
21. See generally FISS, supra note 18, at 4-6 (describing expansion of injunctive relief from school
desegregation to civil rights in general); OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 528-830
(2d ed., Foundation Press 1984) (considering reform of Arkansas prisons as case study of structural
injunctions); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution. Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982) (discussing recent increase in requested injunctions); Susan
Poser, What's a Judge to Do? Remedying the Remedy in Institutional Reform Litigation, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1307, 1307-08 (2004) (reviewing Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY
DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003)) (summarizing scholarly
literature); Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth of Rights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice,8
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469,469-73 (1999) (discussing public interest attorneys' use of legal system to bring
about change).
22. See Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
507 (1984) (defending proactive judicial case management against attack that such management is
redefining rational, fair, and impartial adjudication); Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment:
Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichas Eroding Our Day In Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 982 (2003) (arguing desire for efficiency
overshadows litigants' rights); Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378-80 (1982)
(expressing concern over potential for judges to abuse their discretionary power under case
management regime).
23. The contempt power is considered to be uniquely "liable to abuse." Int'l Union, United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202
(1968)); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76
N.C. L. REv. 407,409 (1998) (championing constitutional review of contempt of court penalties); Felix
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1056 (1924)
(noting that in contempt cases there are "subtle dangers of bias, unconsciously operating, owing to
inevitable human infirmities where one person combines in himself roles of accuser, trier of facts and
intentions, and judge"); Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 345
(2000) (proposing traditional criminal and civil contempt definitions); Douglas C. Berman, Note,
Coercive Contempt and the FederalGrand Jury, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1979) (exploring "use of
coercive civil contempt in federal grand jury investigations").
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these examples, however, the tabula rasa must not be confused with carte
blanche. Indeed, fear of judicial activism and of "individualism run riot" has
made the exercise of judicial power in these and similar contexts especially
24
suspect and highly controversial.
This Article focuses on conditional orders-another exercise of the judicial
imagination. As used here, conditions refer to provisions included in court orders
that contemplate the performance of some other act or the occurrence of some
event. For example, a judge might grant a party's motion to amend to add a new
claim on the condition that the movant agree not to seek a postponement of the
approaching trial date, or a condition might require that the nonmoving party be
compensated for all costs and attorney's fees associated with the new claim. By
incorporating conditions into their orders, judges can impose tailored or
compromise solutions that ensure a more individualized justice. Conditions are
thus an effective and very popular device to mediate a host of competing
concerns and interests. Crucially, however, conditions also test the boundaries of
judicial authority.
I will demonstrate that even in circumstances where a judge's discretion
might be sufficiently broad either to grant or to deny a particular motion, that
discretion is not necessarily so broad as to permit a conditional grant (or
conditional denial). Put another way, the greater does not include the lesser. This
24. Authority for this statement creates interesting bedfellows. See Donald L. Horowitz,
Decreeing OrganizationalChange: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265,
1288-89 (1983) (discussing hazardous nature of judicial reform of large public institutions); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 110 (1999) (claiming
remedies may exceed rights in suits for structural reform injunctions); Louis Raveson, A New
Perspectiveon the Judicial Contempt Power: Recommendations for Reform, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1, 4 (1990) ("The exercise of the contempt power and even the potential for its exercise can have a
serious chilling effect on the vigorousness of advocacy."); Resnik, supra note 22, at 380 (expressing
concern over potential for judges to abuse their discretionary power under case management regime);
Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1406 (1991)
(commenting on failure of critiques of court involvement in public law remedies to develop
"meaningful standards for limiting the court's exercise of remedial power"); John Choon Yoo, Who
Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1121, 1137-38 (1996) (contending that judiciary lacks managerial and implementation skills
required to enforce regulatory remedies); cf Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (holding that Congress, not federal courts, is proper forum to
create new injunctive relief for creditors); David M. Zlotnick, Battered Women & Justice Scalia, 41
ARIz. L. REV. 847, 903-24 (1999) (citing cases demonstrating Justice Scalia's hostility to judicial
contempt power).
For the reference to "individualism run riot," see, ironically, Jack B. Weinstein, Justice and
Mercy-Law and Equity, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1984) (discussing approach of
nineteenth century French judges "who abandoned rules of law completely and instead engaged in ad
hoc decision-making according to the equities of the cases").
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notion that a condition could impose or induce obligations beyond a court's
authority has gone largely unnoticed. Although a few courts and commentators
have touched on discrete aspects of this phenomenon, 25 no one has evaluated the
authority to impose conditions as such. This Article begins to bridge that gap in
the literature.
Part II familiarizes the reader with judicially imposed conditions. Infinite in
number and scope, such conditions can arise in every phase of any litigation
matter. I chart this boundless universe of conditions using an analytical
framework that explores the four primary incentives for judges to impose or
induce conditions. This discussion includes conditions that are routinely applied
by judges as well as those that may be only hypothetical.
Parts III and IV evaluate the use of conditions more broadly and consider
the potential sources of authority for judges to impose them. Given the utility
and ubiquity of conditions, the three sources of authority are surprisingly
deficient or unclear: legislative authorizations are limited in scope and kind, the
inherent authority of courts is largely preempted by legislative regulation, and
party autonomy is a dubious source because consent may be only nominally
voluntary. This want of coherent comprehensive authority to support the
contemporary practice of conditional orders is a curious phenomenon.
Finally, Part V locates that phenomenon within a larger jurisprudential
context. Conditional orders offer judges a creative escape from rigid rules and
predictable outcomes. This interplay between the norms of uniformity and
individualized justice evokes the traditions of law and equity. That conditional
orders are a contemporary manifestation of equity is, itself, an important
observation. But even more significant is the suggestion that, in many instances,
the forces of equity are at work even without formal authority. In a merged
system of law and equity, "[c]onflict between the goals of certainty and
individual justice has created an ambivalent attitude in the law toward equity, to
which the law is attracted [because] . . . of the identification of equity with a
general sense of justice, but which the law ultimately rejects because of the law's
concern for certainty." 26 In form, equity is preserved and codified as discretion,
which reflects a shift toward fixed options and boundaries. In practice, however,
the spirit of equity may innovate and create, whether or not authorized. This
dissonance invites an exploration of both cause and cure.

25. The propriety of judicially imposed conditions has been discussed in a limited number of
contexts. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 648-63 (2005)
(describing conditions, tangentially, in debate about case management); John Bies, Comment,
Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 490 (2000) (examining conditions in
forum non conveniens dismissals). Additionally, for a discussion in the contexts of additurs and
remittiturs, see infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
26. Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CN. L. REV. 329, 330 (2005).
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II.

EXPLORING USES OF THE CONDITIONAL

This Part describes various types of judicially imposed conditions. As
suggested in the paragraphs that follow, judges may use conditions to pursue
more or less directly a variety of objectives. These objectives are clustered into
four overlapping categories: (1) conditions reflecting a close nexus with the
criteria for deciding the motion that is precipitating the court order ("Germane
Conditions"), (2) conditions inspired by notions of fairness ("Fairness
Conditions"), (3) conditions designed to ensure the efficient processing of cases
("Efficiency Conditions"), and (4) conditions expressing judicial fiat ("Power
Conditions").
The boundaries between these four categories are porous, and conditional
orders presented in one category could instead be presented in another with
minor or perhaps even no modifications to the underlying facts. My purpose in
this Part is not to persuade the reader of which conditions belong in which
categories, but rather to illustrate the range and force of possible conditions.
Possible conditions include those that are routinely applied by courts, but also
those that may be only hypothetical. Although this Part presents many concrete
examples, the broader discussion about the judicial discretion to condition must
contemplate an infinite number of variations.
In every hypothetical posed below it is assumed that the court has the
discretion to grant in full or to deny outright the underlying motion. Most of the
examples contemplate orders that are derivative of motions filed pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but this is only for convenience. Other possible
sources in federal court include the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 the
Federal Rules of Evidence,2 8 the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 29 the

27. See, e.g., FED. R. GRIM. P. 21(a) ("Upon the defendant's motion, the court must transfer the
proceeding against that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice
against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial there."); FED. R. GRIM. P. 21(b) ("Upon the defendant's motion, the court may transfer
the proceeding, or one or more counts, against that defendant to another district for the convenience
of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.").
28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(a) ("The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."); FED. R. EVID. 706(a) ("The court may
on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses
should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations.").
29. For example, Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure states:
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Judicial Code, 30 the Criminal Code, 31 the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 the
Federal Arbitration Act, 33 the Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, 34 and even the inherent power of courts. 35 State
36
substantive and procedural laws introduce another tier of motions and orders.
Indeed, conditions can be induced or imposed in virtually any court order.
This Part remains agnostic on the issues of judicial authority to impose or to
induce the contemplated conditions. That analysis is reserved for Parts III and
IV.
A.

Germane Conditions

Determinations that invoke a court's discretion often require a court to
consider a variety of factors when making the decision to grant or to deny a
particular motion. If one or more of those underlying factors to be considered
can be mitigated or avoided, the judge may use conditions to tailor the order to
the circumstances presented. Conditions germane to the decisional criteria can
remove obstacles and make the motion easier to decide. Germane conditions
may be included in orders granting the underlying motion ("conditional grants")
or in orders denying the underlying motion ("conditional denials"). Several
examples follow.

[Wihen an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules
or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any
time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the
request therefore is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).
30. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2000) ("The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.").
31. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664 (2000) (according district court's discretion in ordering
restitution).
32. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (providing that decision to conduct an in camera
review is within trial court's broad discretion).
33. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2000) ("If an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.").
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing general rules for consolidation of multidistrict litigation); 28
U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3) (stating rules for multicircuit petitions for review, which authorize judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation to randomly select court of appeals from within those courts involved to
consolidate petitions).
35. Forum non conveniens, for example, is derived from inherent powers. Edward L. Barrett, Jr.,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REv. 380, 388 (1947).
36. The issues discussed here could be applicable at the level of state courts, though obviously
without the same federalism concerns. Of course, separation of powers issues can also play out
differently at the state level.
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Conditional Grants

In a routine civil litigation dispute, one party may be seeking leave from the
court to exceed certain presumptive limits on discovery. In federal courts, for
example, there is a seven-hour limit on the length of a deposition. 37 The sevenhour limit promotes efficiency and protects against discovery abuse, but courts
may extend the length of the deposition upon consideration of various factors
including the complexity of the case, 38 the density of the subject matter of the
40
deposition, 39 and the sincerity of the parties and persons involved.
Upon a motion for leave, a court with discretion to grant or deny this
motion might choose to grant the motion on the condition that the deposing
party restrict the scope of additional questioning to certain enumerated matters.
The conditional order avoids the two extreme positions, which could have
exposed the deponent to discovery abuse, on one hand, or curtailed legitimate
discovery efforts, on the other. Germane to the criteria for deciding the
underlying motion for leave, such a condition is designed to ensure the deposing
party has a fair opportunity to depose the witness while minimizing the
likelihood that the extended period is used to abuse the witness or to delay the
litigation. Or, in a similar situation, a judge might grant the motion on the
condition that the movant consent that the additional testimony be taken by
telephone or some other remote electronic means. 4 1 Again, the conditional grant
strikes a workable compromise between the extreme positions represented by
the grant in full, on one hand, or by the outright denial, on the other. These are
classic conditions exemplifying a sensible mandate of modest scope and nearly
universal appeal.

37. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
38. See, e.g., Moore v. CVS Corp., No. 7:04-CV-054, 2005 WL 581357, at *2.4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 11,
2005) (considering factors relevant to extending depositions beyond seven hours including number of
claims and parties in case).
39. The Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
example, urge courts to consider, among other factors, whether the deposition requires language
translation, the span of time covered by the events that are the subject of the deposition, and the
number and length of documents about which the deponent is being questioned. FED. R. Civ. P. 30
advisory committee's note (2000).
40. See Miller v. Waseca Med. Ctr., 205 F.R.D. 537, 541-42 (D. Minn. 2002) (noting deposing
party's subtle yet obstructionist tactics). See generally 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2104.1 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp.

2006) (discussing reasons for extending deposition duration).
41. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(7) (allowing parties to stipulate, or court to order on motion, to take
deposition by telephone, or remote electronic means).
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Next, consider a motion to intervene as a matter of right. Assume that the
putative intervenor has a significantly protectable interest that could be impaired
by the ongoing litigation. According to the standard applied by the courts, a
timely motion should be granted unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties. 42 The parties may reasonably dispute the extent
of the judge's discretion to grant or to deny the motion under the representation
prong of the analysis. 43 But both (extreme) courses of action have risks; the
former could needlessly complicate the litigation, and the latter could deprive
the applicants of the opportunity to protect their interest. 44
Again we see that the judge could select one course of action and then
condition that order to minimize the attendant risk. A conditional grant might
require an intervening defendant to cede some control of the presentation of his
case; conditions could appoint the original defendant's attorney as lead counsel
and require other forms of coordination during discovery and trial.45 Closely
aligned with the underlying criteria for deciding the motion, such a condition is
designed to ensure the intervenor the opportunity to participate while
minimizing interference with plaintiffs' prosecution of their case. Somewhat less
benign than the discovery example, the conditional order has created a hybrid
status that may be problematic for the intervenor. 46 The problem is not the
condition per se, but rather the fact that the intervenor may be precluded by this
litigation as though he were a party, yet his ability to participate fully as a party
could be compromised by the appointment of lead counsel and other
47
cooperation requirements.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
43. See, e.g., Mass. School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (noting "the existence of district court discretion over the timeliness and adequacy of
representation issues under Rule 24(a)(2)").
44. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm,78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 217 (2000) (finding that courts have mostly decided cases correctly in answer to
critics of judicial interventions); David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts,
Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 725 (1968) (describing when and to what extent
judicial intervention is appropriate); Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415, 417
(1991) (analyzing standing to sue in light of Rule 24(a)(2)); Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups,
Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281 (1990) (exploring Rule
24(a) intervention in public law cases).
45. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Class Action Lawyers as Lawmakers, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 733, 753-54 (2004) (discussing "free-riding by competing lawyers" in using the intellectual
efforts of others); Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 867 (2005) (proposing "an expansive set of litigation networks" in place of
mass tort class actions).
46. See, e.g., Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner:Standing to Appeal and the Right to
Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 834-38 (2004) (discussing effect of
standing on right of intervenor to appeal).
47. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 383 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[R]estrictions on participation may also be placed on an intervenor of right and on an
original party."); Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. Ad. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 455 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding it improper to impose conditions on intervenors of right); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1922 (2d ed.
1986). But see FED. R. CIv. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) (advocating use of conditions on
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The forum non conveniens context illustrates well the possibility of
especially ambitious germane conditions. Defendants will often file a motion to
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens where certain factors suggest that
underlying principles of justice and convenience may favor dismissal in the
United States court so that the case will be litigated in another forum. We might
assume that certain events giving rise to a particular claim occurred in a foreign
country and that some of the witnesses and evidence are still located in that
country. According to the requisite standard for a forum non conveniens
dismissal, courts are to consider a variety of factors, including whether the
alternative forum is "adequate. '48 Although the bulk of factors to be considered
might weigh heavily in favor of granting the motion to dismiss, imagine further
that certain rules of procedure and evidence in the foreign forum call its
adequacy into question: strict joinder rules might handicap cases involving
multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, discovery essential to the case may not
be discoverable, the statute of limitations may have expired, punitive damages
might be unavailable, the judgment may not be enforceable elsewhere, or the
defendant might enjoy certain immunities. Under these circumstances, the
adequacy of the foreign forum may be sufficiently contested that it would be
within the judge's discretion either to grant or to deny the motion. 49 But the
requires
former course of action risks injustice for the plaintiff, and the latter
50
litigation in a forum that is inconvenient for the court or the parties.
The judge could select one course of action and then condition that order to
minimize the attendant risk. The judge might grant the motion but then impose
conditions on the dismissal to ensure the adequacy of the foreign forum. For
example, the defendant might be required to disclose certain evidence as a
intervenors of right). See generally Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of CoordinationAmong Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381 (2000)
(discussing limited participation by parties through appointment of lead counsel, coordination
requirements, etc.).
48. Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 2000); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
254 n.22 (1981).

49. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257 ("The forum non conveniens determination is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its
balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference."); Alfadda v.
Fenn, 159 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating court's review of forum non conveniens dismissal is
"severely cabined").
50. See, e.g., Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The decision to
dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds 'lies wholly within the broad discretion of the district
court and may be overturned only when we believe that discretion has been clearly abused."' (citation
omitted)); Sigalas v. Lido Mar., Inc., 776 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusing to reverse trial
court's forum non conveniens decision absent abuse of discretion).
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condition precedent to the dismissal, the defendant might be asked to waive its
statute of limitations and immunity defenses in the foreign forum, or the
defendant might be obliged to post a bond to facilitate the enforcement of any
judgment awarded by the foreign court. 51 As with almost all of the conditions
illustrated in this Part, the intensity of the condition can be increased or
decreased for effect. The condition could require the defendant to ensure that
the plaintiff obtains legal representation, to waive certain evidentiary objections
that it would enjoy in the foreign forum, or to consent to nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel in future actions by plaintiffs unable to join as plaintiffs in the
foreign suit. The conditional order is ambitious, and perhaps also insidious,
because it creates a novel hybrid of domestic and foreign practices; the case may
be litigated in the foreign forum pursuant to certain procedures and substance
dictated by the United States court.
Germane conditions also arise routinely under the criminal law. For
example, a conditional grant would be common in a situation where a criminal
defendant who has been banished from the courtroom for being disruptive has
moved to be readmitted. In many such instances, we might assume that it would
be within the judge's discretion either to grant or deny the motion for
readmission. 52 But consider instead conditional grants. A modest condition could
be a promise from the defendant that he will behave. Or the defendant could
agree to be restrained by shackles not visible to the jury. Or the condition for
readmission could be that the defendant agree to be shackled, gagged, and
surrounded by security personnel. 53 Theoretically, of course, the motion could be
granted on the condition that the defendant agree to be placed in a cage inside
the courtroom. Obviously, conditions can introduce special problems in criminal
law given the numerous constitutional safeguards, such as the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial implicated by this example.
Sometimes a condition can enhance the constitutional protections that a
criminal defendant enjoys. Consider, for example, a criminal defendant's
constitutional right of self-representation. 54 When a defendant knowingly and
unequivocally asserts that right within a reasonable time before the
commencement of trial, the court must grant the request. 55 The requirement of
timeliness, of course, ensures that the prosecution of the case is not unfairly
prejudiced through assertion of the right. But when the motion is not timely

51. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
52. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970) (upholding trial judge's decision to banish
defendant from courtroom for unruly, threatening conduct; reversing Seventh Circuit opinion, which
held proper course for trial judge in treating disruptive and disrespectful defendant was to restrain
defendant).
53. See Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1333-35 (2000) (discussing judge's decision to have defendant bound and gagged
in courtroom).
54. ld.; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-36 (1975) (discussing defendant's right to
counsel).
55. People v. Welch, 976 P.2d 754,772 (Cal. 1999).
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made, the court may grant the motion on the condition that the defendant
proceed without a continuance. 56 In this example the germane condition
resurrects the defendant's ability to represent himself even though the
constitutional right had been waived as a result of its tardy assertion.
2.

Conditional Denials

This category of germane conditions must also include conditional orders
denying motions. The most familiar example of a conditional denial may be an
additur or remittitur in the context of a new trial motion. 57 In either instance the
condition is germane to the criteria for deciding the underlying motion-to wit,
whether the jury's verdict is excessive or is inadequate. A motion for a new trial
may be granted if the jury's damage award, in light of the evidence, is excessive
or is inadequate.5 8 And again, in many such instances, a judge could have the
discretion either to grant or to deny the motion.5 9 But, a retrial is expensive,
given the additional cost and delay to the parties and to the court. For this
reason" a judge faced with a new trial motion from one of the parties may wish to
deny that motion with the condition that the nonmoving party accepts a
particular damage award. The conditional denial works a compromise between
the extremes of retrying the case on one hand, or accepting a damage verdict
that is not supported by the evidence on the other.
Conditional denials can also mirror conditional grants. Indeed, a judge
seeking a compromise or intermediate solution to each of the civil litigation

56. See, e.g., People v. Windham, 560 P.2d 1187, 1191 n.5 (Cal. 1977) (noting request for selfrepresentation should not allow defendant to unreasonably delay trial or obstruct justice).
57. Additurs are conditional denials that require defendants to agree to pay a higher damage
award. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (holding that judge may order new trial
where jury returns verdict with inadequate damages, but that Seventh Amendment prohibits judge
from adding to those damages). See generally Irene Deaville Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in the
Federal Courts: An Evaluation with Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 157, 160-64

(1987) (explaining additurs and remittiturs). Remittiturs are conditional denials that require plaintiffs
to accept a lower damage award as the price for denying the new trial motion. See William V.
Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1727 (2001) (stating that
remittitur is "practice ...widely used by trial courts in the federal system" as the mechanism to deal
with excessive jury damage awards). But see generally Suja A. Thomas, Re-Examining the
Constitutionalityof Remittitur Under the Seventh Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003) (arguing

that remittitur is unconstitutional).
58. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE § 2807 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2006).
59. Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries,70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 889-90 (2002);
see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279-80 (1989)
(describing roles of trial and appellate courts in review of jury verdicts).

HeinOnline -- 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1087 2006

1088

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

hypotheticals posed in Part II.A.1 above as conditional grants could instead deny
the motion with conditions that mitigate or avoid the underlying factors to be
considered. In the discovery dispute that framed the first example, the judge
might achieve a similar result by denying the motion to extend the length of the
deposition on the condition that the party defending the deposition agrees not to
oppose interrogatories that might exceed the stated maximum. The discovering
party would have the opportunity for the additional discovery, albeit through
interrogatories rather than deposition testimony. And while interrogatories are
not immune from misuse, the opportunity for discovery abuse would be
I
minimized.
In the second example, the motion to intervene might be denied on the
condition that the plaintiff and the defendant consent to the robust participation
of the putative intervenor as an amicus. That participation could be further
enhanced with conditions requiring the parties to serve the amicus with copies of
all pleadings and discovery and to allow the amicus the opportunity to
participate in all hearings. The conditional denial, much like the conditional
grant, would establish an intermediate position between full participation as a
60
party and nonparticipation.
In the third example, which dealt with forum non conveniens, the judge
might deny the motion to dismiss but use conditions to minimize the
inconvenience the defendant would experience by litigating in the domestic
forum. For example, a plaintiff could be required to make certain concessions in
order to replicate certain substantive or procedural advantages the defendant
might have enjoyed in the foreign court. Such conditions could be as benign as
obtaining consent to a litigation timetable that is convenient for the defendant.
Or the conditions could be much more aggressive, requiring the plaintiff to
refrain from introducing certain evidence that would be inadmissible in the
foreign forum, to stipulate to certain facts to ensure the applicability of foreign
law, to waive the right to a jury trial, to waive the right to appeal, and so forth.
3.

Antithetical Conditions

One must also anticipate that, in theory even if not in practice, germane
conditions could extend beyond the moderation of a court order toward outright
cancellation. Consider, for example, a motion to dismiss a civil rights complaint
on grounds that the complaint lacked factual specificity. The defendant might
argue that the complaint lacked specific facts regarding the dates of the
offending acts and the identities of the alleged offenders. The court could deny
the motion on the condition that the plaintiff add to her complaint the dates of
the offending acts and the identities of the alleged offenders. Such conditions
may be germane to the criteria for resolving the underlying motion; hence, their
inclusion in this category of conditions. Yet these conditions could demand the
antithesis of a denial, the purported mandate of the order. Antithetical

60. Whether the doctrine of claim preclusion would prevent relitigation by an amicus who
participated actively is an open question.
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conditions do not create a tailored or compromise solution, but instead simply
offer something akin to a false choice. In the stated example, the choice for the
plaintiff is either to reject the condition (leading to a dismissal of the complaint)
or to perform the condition (and plead with greater specificity). Interestingly, the
difference between antithetical conditions and other germane conditions
associated with conditional grants and conditional denials may be a matter only
of degree, not kind. After all, in each instance the condition takes away at least
some of what the order otherwise awarded to the victor.
B.

Fairness Conditions

Fairness is an express criterion of many motions, and of course is an implicit
part of the exercise of all judicial power. This Part considers conditions that are
not necessarily germane to the criteria for deciding the underlying motion, but
rather are derivative of a more contextualized pursuit of fairness. Fairness
conditions can minimize prejudice, protect vulnerable parties, and deliver just
results in each application of a uniform rule. Three types of fairness conditions
are introduced here: reciprocity, notice, and leveling the playing field.
1.

Reciprocity

Judges often condition the grant or denial of a motion on some assurance of
reciprocity from the prevailing party. For example, a judge could impose or
induce a condition that required a party moving for additional discovery to agree
that that party would accommodate any similar requests for additional discovery
that might later be made by its adversary. 61 The condition would ensure that the
adversary enjoyed reciprocity, and by extracting the condition, the judge might
avoid hearing and deciding a motion later because the parties presumably would
62
stipulate to the additional discovery without court involvement.
Not all reciprocity conditions, however, would be as symmetrical or benign
as the previous example. Consider instead a motion for leave to extend a
deposition beyond the presumptive time limit that is granted on the condition
that the movants waive enforcement of any limits on any of their adversary's
discovery. Moreover, the asymmetry could appear in contexts with stakes higher
than discovery. For example, a motion to amend could be granted on the

61. See Cynthia Day Wallace, 'Extraterritorial'Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance: Promoting
Reciprocity or Exacerbating Judiciary Overload?, 37 INT'L LAW. 1055, 1057 (2003) (discussing
reciprocal discovery orders between domestic and foreign litigants).
62. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (limiting duration of deposition to seven hours unless more
time is needed for fair examination).
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condition that the movants consent in advance to any motions to amend (or, for
that matter, to any motion at all) that their adversary may later make.
2.

Notice and Opportunity to Cure

Conditions can also be used to notify a party of a court's intent to take some
particular action and to provide that party with an opportunity to avert that
impending action. This form of condition is affiliated with notions of fairness
because the court is giving the target of the notice the opportunity to cure some
defect or default.
The most common example of this condition arises in matters of contempt.
Judges frequently issue orders of contempt that are conditioned on the
performance or cessation of some act within a particular period of time. 63 If the
person or entity that is the subject of the conditional order performs or ceases
the act desired by the court, then the condition is not triggered and the order is
rendered nugatory.
Many orders, of course, could include conditions intended to provide notice
and an opportunity to cure. A motion to dismiss for failure to plead with
particularity could be granted on the condition that the plaintiffs not amend their
complaint to include more particulars within a specified period of time. Similarly,
judges have issued orders granting motions for summary judgment on the
condition that the plaintiff not make available within ninety days affirmative
evidence of defendant's liability. 64
The same issues arise in criminal law. A defendant's motion to stay
sentencing might be granted on the condition that the defendant return to court
within ninety days with proof that he has attended sixty Narcotics Anonymous
meetings or participated in weekly outpatient psychological counseling sessions.
The condition is thus structured to provide the defendant with notice and an
opportunity to cure.
3.

Leveling the Playing Field

Judges might also issue orders with conditions intended to level the playing
field. For example, an order granting a physical examination might be
conditioned on the selection of an examiner that is suitable to the examinee. The
examinee is certainly not entitled to this privilege, and the condition may not be
germane to criteria for deciding the underlying motion seeking this discovery.
Yet this condition giving the examinee veto power over the examiner could be

63. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 208 U.S. 505, 512 (1908) (discussing court's authority to allow
defendant to file answer within five days on condition that he purge himself of contempt by complying
with order for temporary alimony); Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 975 (11th Cir. 1986)
(imposing incarceration penalty for contempt unless party could show good faith effort to comply with
previous order).
64. E.g., Mamola v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 156 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617 (Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that conditional dismissal contingent on plaintiff not proving liability within ninety days is
"fair and liberal exercise" of judicial discretion).
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included to ensure the examinee a modicum of dignity in an otherwise
potentially humiliating experience.
A judge granting a forum non conveniens dismissal could grant the motion
on the condition that the defendant present no defense to liability. Even if not
intended to address some inadequacy in the foreign forum, 65 the condition might
be included out of a desire to level the playing field between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The condition could be the defendant's "price" for obtaining the
forum non conveniens dismissal. 66
Fairness conditions might also be used to offset some tactical advantage
held by one of the parties. For example, much has been written about the
"legalized blackmail" that class actions can enable. 67 Class actions can create an
intense pressure for defendants to settle, and even those defendants with strong
liability defenses may "not wish to roll these dice." 68 To minimize this effect, a
motion for class certification could be conditioned on the class's abandonment of
a claim for punitive damages. Or, the certification could be granted on the
69
condition that class counsel will pay the costs of all defendants if the suit is lost.
These conditions could be wholly unrelated to the criteria underlying the
decision whether to certify the class; rather, it could be motivated by a desire
simply to level the playing field.
Fairness conditions need not be limited to issues of fairness between the
parties. Fairness between a lawyer and her client might also be accomplished
through a condition. For example, a criminal defense attorney's motion to
withdraw as counsel could be granted on the condition that she return a disputed
portion of a retainer to the defendant or on the condition that all discovery
material be disclosed to the new attorney within a specified period of time. In
65. If this were the purpose of the condition then the condition would instead be classified as a
germane condition.
66. See Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that court allowed
defendant to try case away from plaintiffs choice of forum but only if defendant agreed to proceed to
trial solely on damages issue); Chhawchharia v. Boeing Co., 657 F. Supp. 1157, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(directing defendant not to contest liability if foreign forum rejected its defense of release).
67. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973) (arguing
that class actions overly punish defendants while not compensating plaintiffs and that fines and
injunctions would be more effective); William Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of
Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375 (1972) (arguing that in areas of federal antitrust and securities
regulations, class actions more closely resemble "legalized blackmail" and "Frankenstein" than
something deserving praise).
68. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
69. Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 237 (9th. Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring)
("Perhaps the class action order could be conditioned upon an agreement by counsel that they will pay
all costs of all defendants if the suit is lost!").
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these instances, the condition is leveling the playing field not between the
parties, but rather within the attorney-client relationship of one party.
Conditions under the "fairness" rubric could, of course, have more ambition
than the examples offered here and, thus, more potential for benefit and
mischief. Taken to the extreme, conditions could become a Philosopher's Stone:
a single judge's notion of what is fair could introduce myriad conditions
interfering with substantive and procedural law, access to lawyers and courts, the
adversarial process, the attorney-client relationship, and so forth.
C.

Efficiency Conditions

This third category regards efforts by judges to use conditions to ensure the
more efficient processing of cases. Few question that delivering prompt justice is
essential to a true system of justice.70 And delay is often perceived as an
institutional problem that can be cured by judges dedicated to the more efficient
management of cases and the processing of claims. 71 Conditions are one such
efficiency mechanism, with fee shifting and streamlining conditions illustrated
here.
1.

Fee Shifting or Pay-to-Play

Judges can grant certain motions on the condition that the movants pay
their adversary's fees and costs associated with the subject of the motion. For
example, a court could issue an order granting a motion for leave to obtain
discovery that extended beyond presumptive limits on the condition that the
moving party pay to the nonmoving party all of the fees and costs associated with
that additional discovery effort. 72 This condition is designed to ensure the
moving party has the opportunity to engage in discovery while minimizing the
inconvenience and cost incurred by the party's adversary. The condition
internalizes the costs associated with the motion and thus creates the incentive
for the discovering party: (1) to reevaluate whether the discovery is a worthwhile
undertaking, and if so (2) to proceed expeditiously and efficiently so as to
minimize the party's own expense.

70. The old adage advises that "justice delayed is justice denied." The comment is variously
attributed to William Gladstone or Roscoe Pound. See Martel v. County of L.A., 56 F.3d 993, 1003
(9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("Roscoe Pound said 'justice delayed is justice
denied'...."); George Walter Brewing Co. v. Henseleit, 132 N.W. 631, 632 (Wis. 1911) ("Gladstone
has truly said: 'When the case is proved, and the hour is come, justice delayed is justice denied."');
LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 276 (1977) (crediting Gladstone).
71.

See THOMAS

CHURCH, JR. ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN

TRIAL COURTS 5 (1978) (reporting findings taken by National Center for State Courts and National
Conference of Metropolitan Courts spanning over eighteen months, which concluded that most
essential element to reduce pretrial delay is court's concern with delay as institutional and social
problem).
72. See, e.g., Judge Richard M. Markus, A Better Standardfor Reviewing Discretion, 2004 UTAH
L. REv. 1279, 1299 (2004) (noting that court could condition continuance on moving party's agreement
that he pay adversary's additional expenses).
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One could also imagine a simple variation of this condition regarding the
recovery of attorney's fees. A judge could grant a party's motion for additional
discovery on the condition that the party's adversary be compensated in an
amount equal to some multiple of the fees and costs associated with that
additional discovery. 73 The multiplier incorporates a "pay-to-play" component
that imposes an even greater incentive for the movant to undertake the
additional discovery only if it is necessary and, if so, to proceed with ever greater
dispatch. 74 Similarly, a judge could also consider a condition requiring payment
75
of a lump sum.
2.

Streamlining

In addition to conditions that require the shifting of fees, judges have a
variety of other conditions at their disposal to promote the efficient processing of
litigation. Indeed, any motion that is important to a party can be a vehicle for the
court to impose a condition that streamlines the litigation.
For example, in a case where a plaintiff is pursuing several theories of
liability, the trial judge may view one of those theories as especially detrimental
to the efficient processing of the case. The claim might be novel or it might be
inadequately supported, even if it could survive challenges raised by dispositive
motions. If this particular claim requires discovery along certain lines of inquiry
or some other special treatment that the preferred claims do not, a judge might
target the disfavored claim. Under these circumstances, the judge might
condition any order (no matter its relatedness to the offending claim) on the
abandonment by the plaintiff of this claim. The judge would be using the
condition to streamline the litigation.
Bifurcation is another condition that could be incorporated into an
unrelated order. A court might, for example, condition the grant of a motion for
class certification on the condition that the class adjudicate causation issues first.
The bifurcation condition could be unrelated to the criteria underlying the
decision whether to certify the class, but could be included to ensure a more
efficient processing of the case.

73. For example, the motion for leave for additional discovery could be granted on the condition
that the moving party pay to the nonmoving party an amount equal to 1.5 (or two or ten) times the
amount of fees and costs associated with that additional discovery effort.
74. Of course any fee shifting scenario creates an incentive for the party recovering its fees (and
especially were it some multiple of its fees) to engage in delay tactics.
75. The party's motion for leave to obtain the additional discovery could be granted on the
condition that the discovering party must pay a lump sum (e.g., $5000; $50,000; $500,000) to the
adversary, to the court, or even to a particular charity.
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Streamlining conditions can raise a different set of issues in the context of
criminal law. Defendants enjoy a constitutional right to a speedy trial, 76 yet may
also be the party seeking to delay the litigation. Because courts routinely field
motions from defendants and their counsel that could delay the trial (e.g.,
motion for continuance, motion to substitute a new attorney, motion for selfrepresentation), judges may grant those motions on the condition that the
defendant waive his right to a speedy trial. The conditional order thus does not
streamline the immediate litigation, but the condition (if enforceable) could later
streamline the consideration of certain constitutional challenges in the event that
the defendant is convicted.
D. Power Conditions
Of course we must also consider that judges could impose some conditions
for none of the aforementioned reasons, but rather solely for the exercise of
judicial power itself. Ideally, this would be a null set in practice, but there is
potential for such a category of conditions.
We might imagine that, for purposes of levity, a judge might require an
outsider to profess affection for the hometown sports team as a condition of her
otherwise favorable ruling.7" More consequentially, a judge could deny a motion
for sanctions on the condition that the target of that motion wear a clown
costume in court the following day. Or, notwithstanding the Constitution, a
judge could grant a motion on the condition that the prevailing party express
proper appreciation for the ruling by attending a church service.
Formal requirements to satisfy a judge's idiosyncrasies are another category
of power conditions. Through conditions, judges could introduce specifications
regarding the form of pleadings, methods of service, conduct for discovery,
reporting requirements, and other technicalities that may be unassociated with
the underlying motion, not intended to effect some concern for fairness, and
unrelated to the efficient processing of the case. Imagine, for example, a motion
to amend the complaint to add a new coplaintiff; that motion could be granted
on the condition that the existing plaintiff refer to that new party for the
remainder of the case by some demeaning nickname that is chosen by the judge.
Each of these hypotheticals is an example of conditions sourced largely or
primarily in judicial fiat.

76. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) ("[Tlhe inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a [pretrial]
delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past.").
77. See generally Associated Press, Judge's Cheer Seen as Cruel and Unusual,HOUSTON CHRON.,
Feb. 7, 2006, at A4 (detailing negative response to judge's call for a cheer for Seattle Seahawks before

commencing hearing).
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III. THE DISCRETIONARY WHOLE DOES NOT NECESSARILY INCLUDE THE
CONDITIONAL PARTS

The desire to find some middle ground between the extreme positions
urged by the parties on any particular motion is a noble and worthwhile effort. A
compromise solution may be the most fair and equitable resolution, 78 and courts
have a variety of mechanisms to achieve that result. Sometimes a court may be
able to impose an intermediate solution through a partial grant. For example, a
court may award fifty percent of the fees requested, or may exclude two of the
three witnesses that are the subject of a movant's request. In other
circumstances, a court may be able to tailor a solution by granting (or denying)
the motion, and then relying on some alternate source of authority to moderate
the effect of that ruling. For example, the court might grant the plaintiff's motion
to amend, but then as a separate act at a pretrial conference use the court's
authority under Federal Rule 16 to revisit the trial date and allow the defendant
additional time for discovery. But the focus of this Article, of course, is a third
option: the conditional. And what authorizes a court to impose or to induce
conditions?
One might expect the greater to include the lesser, or the whole to include
the parts. 79 But if the authority to condition were always subsumed entirely

78. In certain contexts, the grant of a motion could be the death knell for the litigation. David W.
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A Rather Fantastic Fiction," 103 L.Q.
REv. 398,418 (1987).
79. This deduction is a focal point of debate in several legal contexts. Typically, the reasoning is
that whenever the state can deny a privilege absolutely, then the state may impose any condition on
the exercise of that privilege. Justice Holmes, in particular, is identified with this argument. See Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 602 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he
power to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition .... ' (quoting Packard
v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924)); City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S.
178, 196-97 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (holding that city may require water company to close
altogether; therefore, it may set water rates at any price); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("Even in the law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State
may prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way.");
Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895) ("For the Legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the
rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house....
[T]he Legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to
the dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain
purposes."), affd, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). The syllogism has been disproven in many contexts. See, e.g.,
Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second
Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 694-703 (2002) (noting that
although government may ban all commercial speech, it does not necessarily follow that government
may ban only certain subsections of commercial speech); Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional
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within the authority to decide the motion, the judge should be able to introduce
any condition without incurring reversal. Upon review of Part II, all would surely
agree as a matter of intuitive judgment that some conditions could go too far.
Setting aside for now consideration of which conditions are objectionable, one
must appreciate that there is consensus on the point that some conditions may be
intolerable-whether because the condition flouts the Constitution, 80 defies
common sense,81 is cruel or unfair,8 2 invites corruption,83 or otherwise appears to
be an abuse use of judicial power. 84 Authority to decide the motion does not
necessarily include the power to impose any condition.
Let us revisit the discretion metaphors, then, in the context of conditions.
Each of those metaphors conveys some notion of choice among identifiable
options. Conditions, however, create an infinite number of variations of "grants"
and "denials" that are not easily accommodated by fixed or two-dimensional
85
concepts such as frames, zones, ranges, doughnut holes, and fenced pastures.
Indeed, none of the familiar discretion metaphors suggest the incorporation of
infinite space that an endless number of conditions would require. Thus,
although the grant or denial of the order, considered alone, is within the frame of
possibilities, the attached condition represents not a judicial choice, but rather
judicial creativity operating outside that frame.

Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REV. 443, 456-63 (1966) (discussing
constitutional conditions, and while noting that some such conditions may be unconstitutional, others
may be constitutionally required); Thomas Reed Powell, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLUM.
L. REV. 99, 104-12 (1916) (arguing that, although there is no right to work for state, state may not
discriminate as it pleases against employees or potential employees). See generally Michael Herz,
Justice Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227,
249-80 (1994) (examining Supreme Court case law, and in particular, Justice White's analysis of when,
in fact, the greater includes the lesser); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1413, 1428-56 (1989) (arguing that unconstitutional conditions should not be unconstitutional
but rather should be subject to strict scrutiny); Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One
ConstitutionalRight on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 745-53 (1981) (illustrating
concept, and discussing history, of constitutional conditions); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of
"Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 1010-18 (1986) (exploring constitutionality of conditions and
concluding that conditional denials are actually a "greater" rather than a "lesser" power); John D.
French, Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236-48 (1961) (noting
that conditions allow actors to do indirectly what would not be permitted directly).
80. See, for example, supra note 52 and accompanying text for an example of a judge allowing a
disruptive criminal defendant back in the court room if he consents to remain in a cage, which clearly
implicates the defendant's right to a fair trial.
81. See, for example, supra Part II.A.3 for examples of antithetical conditions offering false
choices.
82. See, for example, supra note 51 for an example of a judge conditioning dismissal on the
posting of a bond by the defendant to ensure the enforcement of a judgment by a foreign court.
83. See, for example, supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of how judges can use the justification of
fairness to cause mischief.
84. See, for example, supra note 77 and accompanying text for an example of a judge requiring
the movant to express an affection for the Seattle Seahawks in order to receive a favorable ruling.
85. See supra Part II for some examples of the infinite number of conditions that judges may
impose.
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One might envision that conditions introduce a new dimension to the
metaphoric representations of judicial discretion. Consider discretion in a
context where a judge has a range of available courses of action: on a motion to
exclude the testimony of the plaintiff's four neighbors, the judge could have
discretion under the circumstances to exclude, as cumulative evidence, none,
one, two, three, or all four of the witnesses. If that discretion is represented in a
linear fashion, the frame of possibilities includes any integer within the 0-4
range. If a selection from within the frame is a conditional order, however, one
must invoke some other metric to sort the permissible from the impermissible
conditions: some conditional orders excluding two of the witnesses may be
within the scope of a judge's authority, but some may not.
Visually, the 0-4 range in this hypothetical could be represented as an xaxis, with a conditional order excluding two of the witnesses introducing a yplane that bisects the x-axis. This is illustrated graphically below. The y-plane
represents the infinite number of conditions that may be introduced. Using x and
y coordinates, then, there are an infinite number of (2, y) solutions. Where y is a
condition that is permissible, the conditional order is a (2, +y) solution that the
court should uphold. And where y is an impermissible condition, the conditional
order is a (2, -y) solution that is unacceptable. Importantly, the authority to
impose x (a selection from the original frame of possibilities) does not
necessarily authorize y (the condition).
'I

y

1-

I'

I

-permissible

conditions

X = original frame

II-

0

1

2

3

4

of possibilities

impermissible conditions

In any given instance, the x-axis could be a one-dimensional range (as
described and illustrated above), a binary choice (e.g., 0 or 1), or a twodimensional or multidimensional plane of options (in instances where the
conferred discretion is a function of more than one determinant). And in each
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instance, the infinite number of conditions could be represented by a y-plane
adding a second dimension (or third or fourth, as the case may be) to the original
frame of possibilities.
A judge's discretion in a given instance might be sufficiently broad either to
grant in full or to deny outright a motion, but not necessarily so broad as to
permit a conditional grant or denial. Of course, the disaggregation of the
authority to condition from the authority to decide the motion does not
necessarily mean that all conditions are impermissible. Whether a particular
conditional order is permissible depends on whether the authority to impose the
condition can be independently sourced. This is the primary observation of my
Article. To carry that observation to the next step, I explore in the next Part
three possible sources of that authority to impose conditions.
IV.

SOURCING THE AUTHORITY TO CONDITION

The authority to condition must be derived, if at all, from one of three
principal sources: legislative authorization, the inherent authority of courts, or
consent.8 6 With regard to the first of these potential sources, the authority to
condition is conferred by the legislature if either (1) the condition is within the
original frame of possibilities, or (2) some other legislative enactment authorizes
the condition. Many contemporary conditions can be sourced to properly
conferred legislative authority. As suggested below, however, this authority is
limited in scope and kind.
Second, some conditions could be sourced in the inherent authority of
courts. Inherent authority means that scope of authority conferred on a trial
court, whether state or federal, that is not expressly authorized by constitution,
statute, or written rule. Inherent powers are a viable source of authority to
condition where rules and statutes are silent.8 7 Unfortunately, there is much
regulatory noise that preempts any definite and meaningful role for inherent
authority in the context of conditional orders.
Finally, the condition could be sourced in a theory of consent or acceptance
by the parties. This approach suggests that even if the court had neither the
legislative nor inherent authority to introduce the condition, the parties may
nevertheless consent to the terms of the conditional order. Nonetheless, because
the consent that is obtained in the context of a conditional order may be only
nominally voluntary, this is a dubious source of authority.
A.

Legislative Authority

Under certain circumstances, the conditional order may be sourced to
authority that has been conferred by the legislature to the courts. The authority

86. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural

Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738-45 (2001) (noting that federal courts' powers come from
inherent authority, positive legislative grant, and legislative consent).
87. FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE
JUDICIARY 37 (1994).
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of Congress to enact procedural rules for the federal courts is well catalogued. 8
That authority could be included as part of the authority to decide the
underlying motion, or the authority to condition could be traceable to some
other legislation. That is, either the x-axis contains the conditional order, or the
condition is within the frame of possibilities on a y-plane that is, itself,
legislatively authorized.
1.

Conditions within the Original Frame of Possibilities

Many of the legislative enactments that prescribe action to be taken on an
underlying motion contemplate outcomes with conditions as part of the original
frame of possibilities. Several of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
example, expressly authorize conditions: in a class action, a court may "impos[e]
conditions on the representative parties,"8 9 discovery orders may be issued
subject to conditions, 90 dismissals may be conditional, 91 subpoenas may issue
"upon specified conditions" to ensure the compensation of witnesses, 92 new trial
motions may be granted or denied with conditions, 93 and courts may grant a
motion staying the execution of judgment with "conditions for the security of the
adverse party." 94 The Advisory Committee Notes that accompany the Rules, a

88. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941) ("Congress has undoubted power to
regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts .. "); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1, 50 (1825) (finding that Congress can delegate power to federal courts to change modes of
proceedings in lawsuits). See generally Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGs L.J. 1039 (1993) (discussing Supreme Court's role
in interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and arguing against using plain meaning approach in
favor of using more comprehensive approach); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions
on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 48 (1988) (noting that

Congress delegates authority to interpret Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Supreme Court).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3).

90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(2).

92. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 62(b).
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95
species of legislative history that may or may96 not confer additional authority,
contemplate conditions in still other contexts.
Provided the condition to be sourced is the condition contemplated by the
original frame of possibilities, these are easy cases. Rule 19, for example,
expressly authorizes "the shaping of relief, or other measures" to avoid prejudice
in matters involving necessary parties. 97 In cases implicating Rule 19, the pursuit
of equitable relief, as opposed to damages, often heightens the risk of prejudice
to parties or nonparties. 98 The frame of possibilities for a judge with discretion to
grant or to deny a motion under Rule 12(b)(7) to dismiss for failure to join a
Rule 19 party99 would thus appear to include orders with "shaping" conditions.

95. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (2002) (suggesting that, because of uniqueness of
congressional delegation to Supreme Court of rulemaking authority, courts should accord Notes
"authoritative effect"); cf Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 512-13 (2003) (noting that, for interpretive purposes, Federal Rule amendments
should remain flexible, with Congress spelling out specific direction in Committee Notes).
96. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) ("An order embodying a
determination [with regard to certification of the class] can be conditional; the court may rule, for
example, that a class action may be maintained only if the representation is improved through
intervention of additional parties of a stated type."). But see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(c)
(removing this provision). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 71A (contemplating deposits required by law as
condition to exercise of power of eminent domain); FED. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note
(2003) ("The question of present conflicts, and the possibility of future conflicts, can be considered at
the time of appointment [of a Master]. Depending on the circumstances, the judge may consider it
appropriate to impose a nonappearance condition on the lawyer-master, and perhaps on the master's
firm as well."); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (2003) ("The terms set for permitting a
new opportunity to elect exclusion from the proposed settlement of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action may
address concerns of potential misuse. The court might direct, for example, that class members who
elect exclusion are bound by rulings on the merits made before the settlement was proposed for
approval. Still other terms or conditions may be appropriate."); FED. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory
committee's note (1991) (noting "traveling non-party witness may be entitled to reasonable
compensation for time and effort entailed"); id. (authorizing "court to ... condition a subpoena to
protect the person subject to or affected by the subpoena from unnecessary or unduly harmful
disclosures of confidential information"); id. (stating that rule requires party seeking expertise to make
"kind of showing required for a conditional denial of a motion to quash as provided in the final
sentence of subparagraph (c)(3)(B); that requirement is the same as that necessary to secure work
product under Rule 26(b)(3)"); id. ("[Rule 45] protects non-party witnesses who may be burdened to
perform the duty to travel .... [It] requires court to condition subpoena requiring travel of more than
100 miles on reasonable compensation."); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note (1966) ("An
intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions
responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings.").
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see also 7 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1609, at 132-33 (2d ed. 1986) (noting court may "order
a pleading amended ... when by restructuring the relief requested plaintiff is able to change the status
of an 'indispensable' party to that of merely a Rule 19(a) party or otherwise prevent the ill effects of
nonjoinder").
98. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 764-69 (1989) (noting that Rule 19, which permits case to
proceed in equity at court's discretion, can have detrimental effects when litigants before court opt for
equitable rather than monetary relief).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7) (stating that defense of failure to join party under Rule 19 may be
made by motion rather than by pleading).

HeinOnline -- 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1100 2006

2006]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO CONDITION

1101

For example, the Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss could be denied on the
condition that the plaintiffs abandon their claim for equitable relief. 100 The
legislatively conferred x-axis appears to include this and other germane
conditions that would mitigate prejudice. 10 1 Rule 19 does not, however, appear
to contemplate any other types of conditions.
Similarly, in the context of consolidating two cases where there exists a
common question of law or fact, Rule 42(a) authorizes "orders concerning
' 2
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."'
Although the language contemplates "orders" rather than conditions, a judge
might fairly invoke this authority to condition the order granting a party's
motion to consolidate. For example, a condition could require the movant to
undertake certain efforts to streamline the presentation of her case so as to
minimize the inconvenience to the other parties. 10 3 The frame of possibilities
thus includes not only grants and denials of the Rule 42 motion, but also grants
with efficiency conditions that address unnecessary costs or delay.
Notwithstanding these examples, however, in the typical situation the
textual authority to grant or deny motions typically does not contemplate
"shaping," "other orders," or conditions that might tailor or temper the order.
Rule 24(a), for example, allows intervention as a matter of right under certain
circumstances but appears to contemplate a binary set of absolute options: either
the motion to intervene should be granted or it should be denied. t n Likewise,
Rule 15 appears to indicate that motions to amend will be granted or they will be
denied; there is no mention of conditions or other middle ground. 0 5 Similarly, if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, then Rule 56 indicates, without further
100. The 1966 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 gives examples
of courts that awarded money damages instead of specific performance when the latter might
adversely affect an absent party. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee's note (1966) (citing Ward v.
Deavers, 203 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Nickel, 141 F. Supp. 41, 45 (N.D. Cal.
1956)).
101. See Main, supra note 95, at 464-76 for the legislative origins of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
103. See City of N.Y. v. Darling-Del., Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,812, at 68,511 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1976) (granting motion to consolidate on condition that movant withdraw request
for jury trial and coordinate participation in discovery).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). By contrast, for permissive intervention the court may be authorized
to impose conditions: "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." Id.
105. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) ("[A] party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.").
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qualification, that a summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith. ' 10 6 Or,
turning to the Judicial Code for another example, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 provides that
on a motion for a change of venue, "a district court may transfer any civil
action"; the statute thus does not appear to contemplate that the motion to
10 7
transfer could be granted or denied conditionally.
One might argue that the authority to condition should be inferred from the
grant of authority to decide a motion-that the greater includes the lesser.
Legislative exhortations may even appear to support such inferences: the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, are to "be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. ' 10 8 To be
sure, germane or fairness conditions could better facilitate the just determination
of an action, and efficiency conditions could expedite and streamline. But
practical and constitutional constraints urge caution in inferring the authority to
109
condition.
As a general matter, courts are hoist by their own petard. The "legislation"
in the context of many conditional orders is a Federal Rule drafted by the
Supreme Court rather than Congress. 110 As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have become increasingly more elaborate and
technical."' And of course these additional layers of detailed prescriptions
interfere with judicial discretion and flexibility. Rule 23 is perhaps the most
egregious example. Its textual mandates have been blamed by judges distancing
themselves from inequitable, unfair, and unfortunate results regarding notice

106. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
109. See infra notes 151-55 for a discussion of the interaction of Articles I and III of the
Constitution.
110. Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are legislative enactments by virtue of the
Rules Enabling Act, they are, as a matter of fact, drafted by judges. Such drafters include the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072-2073.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress may delegate to the Court authority to
promulgate procedural rules. As early as 1825, in Wayman v. Southard, the Court held that Congress
had full authority to regulate procedure in the federal courts, but that Congress had also permissibly
delegated to the Court procedural rulemaking authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789. 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 2 (1825). Since 1825, courts routinely have recognized that Congress has the authority to
delegate procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court, that Congress has delegated that
authority to the Supreme Court, most recently pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, and that Congress,
by virtue of its delegation, retains the power to recall that delegation. See generally Martin H. Redish
& Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules EnablingAct, and the Politicizationof the Federal
Rules: Constitutionaland Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1303 (2006) (arguing that Rules
Enabling Act delegates legislative authority to courts, effectively dodging accountability for rule
promulgation).
111. See Main, supra note 95, at 464-76 (detailing number, pattern, and length of amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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obligations, 112 settlement class actions, 113 and the unavailability of opt-in
actions.114 But Rule 23 is not the only such rule." 5 Paradoxically, even efforts to
enhance judicial discretion may, in fact, ultimately narrow it. Recent
amendments to Rules 19, 23, 26, 41, 45, 50, and 62 authorize certain types of
conditions, but this level of detail also undermines the legitimacy of an inference
11 6
of authority regarding other conditions and other rules.
Because "Congress knew how to draft [a condition] when Congress wanted
to," 1 7 we should be reluctant to transplant conditions that are expressly
authorized by one rule into some other rule that does not contemplate
conditions." 8 When a court rewrites a rule, it rides roughshod over the
democracy's decision to regulate the event.11 9 The familiar canon of statutory
construction recognizes that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another

. . .

it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion."' 20 This standard method of reasoning applies when comparing

112. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974) (recognizing that Court's holding
may constitute death knell for class action but holding that "the express language and intent" of Rule
23 requires individual notice).
113. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) and in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1998), the Court applied the prerequisites for certification and rejected class certification
even while acknowledging that the class settlements were both substantively and procedurally fair.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617-24; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 852-59.
114. See Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W]e cannot envisage any
circumstances when Rule 23 would authorize an 'opt-in' class in the liability stage of a litigation.").
115. See Main, supra note 95, at 464-76 (tracing history of amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
116. For example, until 2003, Rule 23(c)(1) allowed "conditional" certifications of class actions.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) (1998) (amended 2003). By amendment, the invitation to conditional
certification was removed, and Rule 23(c)(1)(C) instead recognizes that the certification order may be
altered or amended before final judgment in the action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(C).
117. Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
118. See generally Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One's Customers and the Dilemma of
Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 754-56 (2005) (collecting
citations used throughout this discussion).
119. Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the FederalCourts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the
Frontierof the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1178 (2006).
120. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim
Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("Had
Congress intended to restrict § 1963(a)(1) to an interest in an enterprise, it presumably would have
done so expressly as it did in the immediately following subsection (a)(2).").
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122
provisions within a single statute, 121 comparing related acts over years,
comparing early versions of an act from what was eventually passed by
Congress, 23 comparing different titles of federal law, 124 and generally when
reasoning about Congress's drafting experience.125 This standard Congress-

121. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) ("[Title 18] § 924(d)(1)
demonstrates that Congress knew how to draft a statute to reach a firearm that was 'intended to be
used.' In § 924(c)(1), it chose not to include that term .... "); Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. at 337
(comparing Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 with Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 and noting that where Congress meant to exempt waste generation of
certain facilities from liability it expressly provided so); Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208 (noting that while
statutory section at issue only included word "jurisdiction," neighboring subsections included words
"jurisdiction to render judgment," which Court determined prevented it from interpreting former to
mean latter); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) (comparing
provisions of Bankruptcy Code and explaining that "[o]bviously, Congress knew how to draft an
exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted to; its failure to do so in this instance
indicates that Congress intended that § 365(a) apply to all collective-bargaining agreements covered
by the NLRA"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Simplicity Pattern, 360 U.S. 55, 67 (1959) ("[T]he only escape
Congress has provided for discriminations in services or facilities is the permission to meet
competition as found in the § 2(b) proviso [of the Clayton Act]. We cannot supply what Congress has
studiously omitted."); United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 819 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding that
Congress's silence does not signify it "intended [Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute] predicate
offenses to constitute mere means of violating a single CCE offense").
122. See, e.g., Neff v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., 352 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.5 (7th Cir. 2003)
(comparing Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and
noting "[s]ignificantly, Congress thus knew how to write a broader definition of 'creditor,' yet chose
not to do so in TILA"); Renteria-Gonzalez v. Immigration & Nationalization Serv., 310 F.3d 825, 834
(5th Cir. 2002) (comparing Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), and reasoning that older
title provisions showed that new exceptions were not intended: "[T]he INA proves that Congress
knew how to write exceptions for certain kinds of post-conviction relief.").
123. See, e.g., Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 252 F.3d 473,486 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (referring to provision proposed but not passed in final version of law, and noting "[t]he
legislative history underscores the point that Congress knew exactly how to write a statute to state that
filing a refund request could trigger an 'administrative proceeding"'); Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 211 F.3d 1280, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that Congress, in original rule relating to
Native Americans' authority to implement Clean Air Act, only extended tribal jurisdiction to "within
the area of the tribal government's jurisdiction," while final version also included "the exterior
boundaries of the reservation," indicating clear congressional intent to broaden tribal jurisdiction with
respect to Clean Air Act).
124. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 89 (1991) (comparing cost-shifting
provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), providing for "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses...
and reasonable attorney fees," to "reasonable attorney's fee" cost-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. §
1988); Int'l Union v. Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d 1243, 1249 (6th Cir. 1996)
(comparing Title 11 and Title 12 provisions to conclude "[tihe fact that Congress revised the
Bankruptcy Code in 1984 to exempt collective bargaining agreements from a contract repudiation
provision similar to the provision at issue here simply indicates to us that Congress knew how to draft
such an exemption"); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th
Cir. 1994) (comparing Title 38 veterans' benefits with Title 29 ERISA and finding that "Congress
knew how to draft a statute protecting benefits that had left the pension plan, and it did not use similar
language with ERISA section 206(d)(1)").
125. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 884 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to
find Indian Nation exception to federal wagering excise tax because "[h]ad Congress intended to
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knew-how-to-draft reasoning follows from the Court's recognition that it is "our
duty to refrain from reading a phrase into the statute when Congress has left it
1 26

out."

The knew-how-to-draft argument is especially compelling when one
compares the two drafting institutions. In the typical case requiring statutory
interpretation, knowledge is ascribed to Congress even though it is an institution
that is a relatively large group consisting of distracted, diverse, and transient
individuals with generalized knowledge. 27 In stark contrast, the drafters of
procedural rules are a small, stable, and cohesive group with a narrow agenda,
immense expertise, and no time constraints. 28 With the latter, knowledge and
29
institutional memory are not merely convenient fictions; they are facts.'

provide tribes with an exemption from the federal wagering excise taxes, it clearly knew how to draft
such an exemption").
126. Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 208. The Congress-knew-how-to-draft argument is also a regular
argument of legal scholars. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 622, 625 (1999) (explaining how Congress's decision to occasionally draft provisions with
formalistic rules suggests overall scheme of antitrust statutes was nonformalistic, where no formalistic
rules were explicit).
127. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990)
(analyzing Justice Scalia's plain meaning interpretation of statutes, which eschews any effort to discern
congressional intent and focuses almost exclusively on statutory language); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (contending that
"quest for ... legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase" because "Congress ... didn't think
about the matter at all").
128. See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and ProceduralEfficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887,896 (1999) (referencing view that committees of
judges are best suited for procedural rulemaking due to limitations on time and resources and ability
to pool expertise of lawyers, scholars, and judges); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal
Rulemaking Process,44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1664-65 (1995) (explaining that each committee contains
a law professor with expertise in committee's subject area).
129. With regard to the fiction in the context of Congress, see David B. Rodriguez, Statutory
Interpretationand Political Advantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 221 (1992) ("What legitimizes
legislative history as a source of legislative intent is not so much the probative value of this history, but
instead, the democratic fiction that the history of a statute has been accepted by Congress as a body...
• Congress should be understood, so this argument goes, to vote upon a legislative package (text +
history) and not merely the text alone." (citation omitted)). See also Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative
Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1156 (1992) (noting "legislators
view legislative 'intent' as the policies represented in the statutory text and explained by the legislative
leaders for any particular bill"); James M. Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation,"43 HARv. L.
REV. 886, 888-89 (1930) ("Through the committee report, the explanation of the committee chairman,
and otherwise, a mere expression of assent becomes in reality a concurrence in the expressed views of
another."); Jeremy Waldron, Legislators' Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND
INTERPRETATION 355-56 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (concluding that under this theory, legislative
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Next, inferring the authority to condition from the hortatory language of
Rule 1 would be an unprecedented use of Rule 1. Rule 1 articulates the "scope
and purpose" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the modest
prescription that the exercise of discretionary authority pursuant to "[t]hese
rules" be undertaken in a manner that advances the universal goals of just,
speedy, and inexpensive determinations. 130 This exhortation thus would seem to
apply to the exercise of discretion within the frame of possibilities (i.e., along the
x-axis), not outside it. As I have detailed elsewhere, occasionally Rule 1 is cited
in the context of resolving a lacunae or nonexistent norm.131 Rule 1 is also
invoked as additional authority for the straightforward application of another
procedural rule. 132 Also, efforts to channel the "spirit" of the Federal Rules are
often accompanied by citations to this rule. 133 But citations to Rule 1 for the
purpose of avoiding the straightforward application of some Federal Rules are
34
rare and unremarkable exceptions that prove the rule.
Of course, the system's overactive rulemaking gland already discussed
neutralizes any prospect that the hortatory language of Rule 1 could be
transformed into a. source of authority to condition. 135 Although many
commentators, including myself, have urged judges to engage in a purposive and
dynamic reading of the Federal Rules, 136 the rulemaking process must also be
history becomes like text-it matters not why the person voted for it (even if they were mistaken), for
the words bind them).
130. Rule 1 provides:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions
stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Interestingly, the words "and administered" were added to Rule 1 by 1993
amendment. In the Advisory Committee Note, the drafters noted that the amendment recognized that
judges had an "affirmative duty," but that duty extends only "to exercise the authority conferred by
these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee's note (1993).
131. Main, supra note 95, at 500 & n.424.
132. Id. at 500 & n.425.
133. Id at 500 & n.426.
134. See In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (using Rule 1 in conjunction
with equitable maxim that ensures where there is a wrong there is a remedy), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d
Cir. 2005); Rollerblade, Inc. v. Rappelfeld, 165 F.R.D. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1995) (extending time for
service of process under Rule 4(m)); Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale, 159 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(concluding that just, speedy, and inexpensive determination requires court to exercise its discretion to
extend time period for serving process when process was served one day late); TPI Corp. v. Merch.
Mart of S.C., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 684, 692 (D.S.C. 1974) (permitting permissive intervention,
notwithstanding considerable contrary authority, because justice required it).
135. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
176 (1994) ("Congress knew how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so.");
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988) ("When Congress wished to create such liability, it had little
trouble doing so."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734 (1975) ("When
Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it had little
trouble in doing so expressly.").
136. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustrationof the Supreme Court's
Role as Interpreterof the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 720, 720 (1988)
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respected.1 37 Certain rules already authorize certain conditions. Failure to use
the Rules Enabling Act procedure to expand that authority to condition
circumvents the congressional oversight and feedback envisioned by the
legislation. Accordingly, while some conditions will be included within the
original frame of possibilities, many others will not. Conditions that are not
within the original frame of possibilities are not necessarily impermissible.
Nonetheless, conditions that are not on the original x-axis introduce a y-plane
that, if legitimate, must be sourced to some other authority.
2.

Conditions Authorized by Other Legislation

In certain contexts, some other legislative enactment could expressly
authorize the condition. For example, if a plaintiff moves to amend his complaint
to add an additional party in federal court, the court must consider, inter alia,
whether "justice so requires" allowing the amendment. 138 Under these
circumstances the court may have discretion to grant or to deny the motion to
amend, and Rule 15 does not expressly authorize conditions. With this example,
the x-axis contains only the binary options to deny (x=O) or to grant (x=l), with
no accommodation for conditions. Nevertheless, the court might grant the
motion on the condition y that plaintiff agree that the case be transferred to the
Northern District of Florida, a forum where the case originally could have been
brought. In this instance, authority to decide the underlying motion is conferred
by Rule 15, with the authority to impose condition y conferred, if at all, by 28
U.S.C. § 1404.139 Provided the condition is within the "frame of possibilities"
conferred by the legislature for a § 1404 transfer, the conditional order (x,y) is
legislatively authorized by Rule 15 and 28 U.S.C. § 1404, respectively.
But few conditions appear to fit within this category. For example, germane
conditions modify the criteria underlying the principal motion and thus, almost
by definition, are not themselves motions that could be sourced to some
independent authority. Some conditions might be related to an existing rule but

(arguing that because Supreme Court promulgates Rules, federal courts are "fully justified in taking
an expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny, giving it a liberal reading if that is required to
fulfill the purposes of the Rule or to do justice between the parties before the court"); Main, supra
note 95, at 495 (suggesting equity and "broad judicial discretion" as solutions to procedural
insufficiencies of Rules); Moore, supra note 88, at 1039-40 (advocating activist approach where judges
consider purpose and policy behind Rules instead of focusing solely on plain meaning doctrine).
137. Accord Struve, supra note 95, at 1102 (arguing that paradoxically, "Congress's delegation of
rulemaking authority should constrain, rather than liberate, courts' interpretation of the Rules").
138. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) (authorizing change of venue for "convenience of parties and
witnesses" and needs of justice).

HeinOnline -- 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1107 2006

1108

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

are not authorized by that rule. Efficiency conditions, for example, may impose
fee shifting but are unlikely to be authorized by Rule 11, which has specific
conduct triggers, 14° detailed procedures, 141 and an institutionalized bias against
142
"fee shifting."'
Some conditions could be authorized by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
16 and 26, which authorize trial courts to exercise certain managerial control
over civil cases. 143 Rule 16, for example, confers considerable authority provided
it is exercised at a pretrial conference "under this rule." 1" Rule 26 confers
authority to police the scope and amount of discovery under certain
circumstances. 145 Accordingly, if on a motion to extend a deposition beyond the
140. Under subdivision (c) of Rule 11, the court "may... impose an appropriate sanction" when
"subdivision (b) has been violated." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Subdivision (b) provides as follows:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so
identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
141. Although sanctions initiated on the court's initiative need not comply with the safe harbor
provisions applicable to sanctions initiated upon motion by a party, "[m]onetary sanctions may not be
awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause." FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2)(B). Also, "[w]hen imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." FED. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(3).
142. Subdivision (c)(2) of Federal Rule 11 emphasizes, first, a general limiting principle that the
sanction imposed "shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated." FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2). Next, the Rule emphasizes
the availability of nonmonetary sanctions as an alternative to monetary sanctions. Id. And then, the
Rule states that monetary sanctions would be payable to the court unless "if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonableattorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation." Id. (emphasis
added).
143. Daniel J. Meador, Inherent JudicialAuthority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L
REV. 1805, 1806 (1995).
144. FED. R. Cv. P. 16(c). For actions taken at a pretrial conference, Rule 16 authorizes a judge
to "take appropriate action" regarding a number of enumerated matters pertaining to motion and trial
practice, discovery, and scheduling. Id. The authority includes actions taken at a pretrial conference
"with respect to such other matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
the action." FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(16).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Federal Rule 26(b)(2) provides that the court may alter discovery limits
and also "[tihe frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under these
rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). Federal Rule 26(c) provides:
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presumptive seven-hour limit, the court granted the motion on a condition that
the moving party agree not to oppose any similar motion filed by its adversary,
146
authority to decide the motion to extend would be found in Rule 30(d)(2),
while the reciprocity condition could be grounded in the court's authority to
manage discovery under Rules 26(b)(2) and 26(c). The conditional order (1, y )
could thus be authorized by Federal Rules 30(d)(2) and 26, respectively. If a
condition y2 instead (or in addition) imposed a fee shift (or some multiple of
fees), the issue then would be whether y2 fell within the scope of judicial
authority conferred by some other source. And, as already discussed, such
conditions probably do not.
1

B.

InherentAuthority

Certain conditions may constitute a proper exercise of the inherent
authority of courts. Inherent authority means the scope of authority conferred
on a trial court, whether state or federal, which is not expressly authorized by the
constitution, statute, or written rule. This authority flows from the powers
possessed by a court simply because it is a court; it is an authority that inheres in
the very nature of a judicial body and requires no grant of power other than that
which creates the court and gives it jurisdiction. 147 The narrow parameters of this

(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion... the court ... may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had;
(2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions,
including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or
discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Federal Rule 26(d) provides that a court may "upon motion" alter the timing
and sequence of discovery. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(d).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (limiting deposition to one seven-hour day unless additional time is
granted).
147. Meador, supra note 143, at 1805.
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jurisprudence make it a possible but unlikely source of authority for a y-plane
introducing conditions in a given instance.
The Supreme Court has long defined "inherent powers" as those which
"cannot be dispensed with ...

because they are necessary to the exercise of all

' 148

The Court has often cautioned that "[t]he extent of these [inherent]
others.
powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching when
one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction
from the others, undertakes to define its own authority. '149 Accordingly,
inherent powers extend only to those instances "necessary to permit the courts
to function."' 150 As a starting point, then, few germane, fairness, or efficiency
conditions would seem to be absolutely "necessary." Modifying the criteria
underlying a motion with a germane condition, for example, would perhaps be
better described as constructive or beneficial. Efficiency conditions, too, might
be extremely useful, yet still not necessary. Some fairness conditions could be
truly necessary in exercise of the judicial task, but certainly not those that are
part of the standard litigation fare. Nevertheless, most judges and commentators
would likely cite "inherent authority" as the contemporary source of authority to
impose or to induce conditions in the ordinary course. But are they right?
The Court has never reconciled precisely how the Constitution
simultaneously limits federal courts (especially as compared to Congress), yet
authorizes them to exercise "inherent authority.' 151 Indeed, the Constitution
provides little or no guidance as to how the judiciary should go about exercising
its authority in the ordinary course. 152 The Justices have generally avoided the
larger constitutional questions by focusing on the individual inherent power
involved in each case. 153 The parameters of inherent judicial authority seem
narrow given the "necessity" definition and the Court's frequent admonition that
it be exercised cautiously. 154 Yet federal judges have repeatedly cited "inherent
powers" as a catchphrase to rationalize a wide range of actions that may be

148. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32,34 (1812)).
149. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (citing Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752,764 (1980)).
150. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 819-20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. As one commentator has argued:
Any judicial invocation of inherent power . . . seems to clash with three principles of
constitutional structure that the Court has long endorsed. First, the American government is
founded upon a written Constitution that enumerates and limits the powers of each
department, with particularly stringent restrictions placed on the judiciary. Second, the ...
Constitution vests Congress with full power over the judiciary's structure, jurisdiction, and
operations. Third,... Congress makes federal law, both substantive and procedural, which
judges merely interpret and apply.
Pushaw, supra note 86, at 739.
152. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 (1914) (regarding "what the

[judicial] power is, what [is] its intrinsic nature and scope, [the Constitution] says not a word").
153. Pushaw, supra note 86, at 739-40.
154. See, e.g., Degen, 517 U.S. at 823 ("Principles of deference counsel restraint in resorting to
inherent power ... ").

HeinOnline -- 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1110 2006

2006]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO CONDITION

beneficial but are not truly essential to the proper exercise of judicial
155
authority.
Although unclear in its scope, the authority to "manage litigation" is often
listed among the inherent powers of federal courts. 156 This authority is usually
traced to Link v. Wabash Railroad,157 a case in which the district court invoked
inherent authority to dismiss the case when the plaintiff's counsel failed to
appear at a pretrial conference. In upholding the district court's inherent
authority, the Supreme Court described the district court's power to dismiss as
one of "ancient origin."' 158 The Court found that the power to dismiss was
"necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases
and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts."1 59 The Court
found this inherent power to dismiss "governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."' 160 Under the "managing
litigation" rubric, the inherent powers of a federal court may also include
controlling admission to its bar, disciplining attorneys who appear before the
court, punishing for contempt, vacating a judgment on proof of fraud, barring

155. Pushaw, supra note 86, at 738; see also Lear, supra note 119, at 1159 (describing broad range
of actions that federal courts have justified with "inherent powers"); William W. Van Alstyne, The
Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976,
at 102, 113 (noting tone of opinions evaluating "helpful or appropriate" uses of inherent power, versus
those claiming to be rooted in specific constitutional grant, is not "legal"; there is very little "law" to
speak of and decisions "read no more 'judicially' than a good congressional committee report, because
that is essentially what [they are]").
156. See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a ClearerJudicial Role
in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 58 (1994) (discussing historic origins of using inherent power to
manage litigation); Andrew J. Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere
Recommendations, 62 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 493, 497 (1988) ("The creators of the Manual [for Complex
Litigation] remind us that 'it is not binding law. It has no binding effect. It is only as good as the
credibility of the authors and the utility of the materials.' The Manual asserts that its
recommendations, like the Federal Rules, are examples of the court's inherent authority to manage
litigation." (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.1, at 6 (2d ed. 1985))); James Wheaton,
CaliforniaBusiness and ProfessorialCode Section 17200: The Biggest Hammer in the Tool Box?, 16 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 421, 433 (2001) (describing trial courts' use of their inherent authority to manage
litigation when private action interferes with public prosecutions).
157. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
158. Id. at 630.
159. Id. at 629-30.
160. Id. at 630-31.
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disruptive criminal defendants, and dismissing a case on forum non conveniens
grounds. 161 But still: What about germane, fairness, and efficiency conditions?
Inherent authority is part of the broader topic of judicial case
management. 62 That topic, involving the extent to which a trial court should
affirmatively assert authority-inherent or otherwise-over its proceedings, has
sparked much debate in recent decades. Views among judges, lawyers, and
commentators differ as to the degree of "managerial judging" that is desirable or
appropriate. 163 At one end of the spectrum, there are those who believe that the
structure and process of a case should be left largely in the hands of the litigants
through the adversary process, with the judge acting mainly in response to issues
churned up by the moves of the lawyers. At the other end, there are those who
endorse vigorous, affirmative judicial management-especially in the pretrial
stage-diminishing traditional party control in order to reduce expense and
delay. That policy debate need not be joined here. Rather, the issue is the extent
to which the inherent power of courts may extend to the introduction of
conditions into court orders.
Although there exists an absolute core of judicial power that is immune
from congressional regulation, 164 "the Court has long acknowledged that most of
165
its inherent authority is subject to partial or complete legislative control."'

161. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44 (1991).
162. Meador, supra note 143, at 1805-07.
163. Compare Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition,69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981) (endorsing managerial
judging for increasing productivity of federal courts), with Resnik, supra note 22, at 380 (criticizing
managerial judging).
164. The power to condition is certainly not among the core inherent powers that encompass the
constitutional duty to independently adjudicate cases and controversies. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding unconstitutional congressional attempt to require courts to
reconsider final judgment under Securities Exchange Act); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144-47
(1871) (holding unconstitutional congressional statute that attempted to define scope of presidential
pardon power and to dictate outcome in pending case); Evan Caminker, Allocating the JudicialPower
in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 TEx. L. REV. 1513, 1518-21 (2000) (discussing contours of adjudicatory
power); Pushaw, supra note 86, at 844 ("This pure 'judicial power' consists of applying pre-existing law
to the facts in a particular case, then rendering a final, binding judgment.").
165. Lear, supra note 119, at 1152; see also, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437
(2000) ("Congress retains the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of
evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution."); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47-49
(finding that sanctioning authority of courts was not foreclosed by adoption of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787,799 (1987) ("The manner in which
the court's prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by Congress ....");
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ("[T]he attributes which inhere in [the
contempt] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically
inoperative [by Congress]. That it may be regulated within limits not precisely defined may not be
doubted."); David E. Engdahl, IntrinsicLimits of Congress' Power Regarding the JudicialBranch, 1999
BYU L. REv. 75, 80, 104-32 (1999) (discussing sources of Congress's power to control judicial branch
beyond Necessary and Proper Clause); Lear, supra note 119, at 1161 (stating that Congress's Article I
authority permits it to preempt Court's inherent powers); Pushaw, supra note 86, at 848 ("[T]he
Constitution should be construed as allowing only legislation that facilitates the courts' exercise of
their implied indispensable powers or that reasonably regulates minor details of such powers.").
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Article I vests in Congress the rulemaking power,1 66 and a court cannot exercise
its inherent authority in violation of a valid rule. 167 Indeed, the very purpose of
inherent powers is to ensure "that the adjudicative process can function" when
rules and statutes are silent.' 68 Much of the jurisprudence of inherent powers
thus regards the exercise of judicial authority in the absence of congressional
regulation.1 69 Accordingly, no matter how useful and practical a device the
condition could be, the promulgation of a rule and its contemplated frame of
possibilities may preempt the exercise of inherent authority to condition.
The scope of the inherent authority to condition, then, may be inversely
related to the degree of particularity and comprehensiveness in the source of
authority to decide the underlying motion. This line of argument tracks much of
the previous discussion about the limited ability to infer legislative authority to
condition in contexts where there is already legislative noise. Here, too, statutes
or rules that are less comprehensive would allow greater room for a trial court's
exercise of inherent authority to condition. And once again: more detailed
schemata like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tend to foreclose that
authority. Inherent authority, the thinking goes, is less necessary when the rules
170
themselves are comprehensive.
Even where there is regulation, in certain very limited contexts the Court
has recognized inherent authority that complements that regulation. In Link, the
Court recognized inherent power notwithstanding a Federal Rule that was on
point but did not authorize the district court's action. 171 Rule 41 authorized a
dismissal for nonprosecution on motion by the defendant, and the Court
recognized inherent authority to dismiss sua sponte. 172 The Court noted the
"ancient origin" of the dismissal right and emphasized that the Federal Rule did

166. U.S. CONST. art. I; see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825)
(delineating Congress's constitutional authority to make all "necessary and proper" laws and plain
limits on judicial branch's authority).
167. Meador, supra note 143, at 1816.
168. STUMPF, supra note 87, at 37.
169. See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (explaining that courts' inherent power
exists in absence of legislation); Cash v. Riggens Trucking, 757 F.2d 557, 563-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc) (stating that inherent power exists only where legislature'does not provide contrary direction).
170. The fallibility of that reasoning does not affect the issues of authority addressed here. See
Main, supra note 95, at 511 (explaining that rulemaking schemes can be both flexible and allow for
discretion).
171. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962).
172. Id. at 630.
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not clearly express congressional intent to abrogate the federal courts'
173
traditional inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution on their own.
Similarly, the Court has recognized an inherent authority to sanction
notwithstanding certain legislative authority already in place. In Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc.,174 one party tried to deprive the district court of jurisdiction
through various fraudulent and bad-faith actions. The trial court invoked its
inherent authority to sanction this conduct by ordering Chambers to pay all of
their adversary's fees, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 175 The Court held that
the sanctioning provisions in federal statutes and procedural rules, which
"reache[d] only certain individuals or conduct," did not displace the inherent
'176
sanctioning power, which "extend[ed] to a full range of litigation abuses.'
Although the Court acknowledged the legislature's right to limit inherent
authority, it would "not lightly assume that Congress ha[d] intended to depart
from established principles" (the longstanding precedent recognizing inherent
sanctioning power) by approving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 177 "[I]f in
the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to
the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power. '178 While conceding
that many of Chambers's actions could have been sanctioned under existing
laws, the Court concluded that such conduct was intertwined with behavior that
179
fell outside their scope.
One might fairly argue, then, that even in contexts where there is regulatory
noise, inherent powers may authorize complementary conditions of "ancient
origin." But, of course, this is a rather onerous standard. Both Link and
Chambers regarded a court's indispensable authority to impose order, respect,
decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful mandates. Some germane,
efficiency, or fairness conditions may tap this deep, ancient root, but most
contemporary conditions instead tinker at the surface.

173. Id. at 629-33. The Court characterized a dismissal for lack of prosecution as "of ancient
origin, having its roots judgments of nonsuit and non prosequitur entered at common law." Id. at 630
(citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 295-96, 451 (1768)).

174. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
175. Chambers,501 U.S. at 42-58. The Court began its opinion by reiterating that federal judges
necessarily had the inherent power to manage their proceedings and control the conduct of those who
appeared before them. Id. at 43-44; see also id. at 44, 50 (cautioning that such authority should be
exercised with restraint).
176. Id. at 46. For instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorized the award of attorney's fees only against
lawyers who vexatiously multiplied proceedings. Chambers,501 U.S. at 33. It did not cover parties who
had done so, and did not reach other attorney misconduct, such as lying to the court. Id. at 41-42.
177. Id. at 47 (citation omitted). For example, the Court maintained that the 1983 Amendments
to the Federal Rules addressing sanctions (most notably Rule 11) sought only to supplement, not
displace, the courts' existing inherent power to deal with litigation abuses. Id. at 48-49 (citing Zaldivar
v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (1986)). The Court also cited the Advisory Committee Notes, which
indicated that the amended sanctioning provisions were designed "to obviate dependence upon.., the
court's inherent power" as demonstrating "no indication of an intent to displace the inherent power."
Id. at 48 n.13 (citation omitted).
178. Chambers,501 U.S. at 50.
179. Id at 50-51.
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I am not undertaking here to define the boundaries of the inherent
authority to condition. Rather, my effort is to shed light on possible limitations.
Inherent authority may authorize certain conditions in particular instances, but it
fails as a broad source of authority for two reasons. First, the jurisprudence of
inherent powers is purposely narrow: "Inherent powers are the exception, not
the rule, and their assertion requires special justification in each case." 180 The
rules are framed through a process that strikes a delicate balance between the
needs of efficiency in litigation and the rights of the parties. Imposing conditions
could frustrate Congress's will and infringe the due process rights of the plaintiff,
who may have no fair notice that the court could impose such conditions.
Second, even if one assumes a broader view of the inherent authority of courts,
that authority can be preempted by legislative interference. Accordingly, in
instances where there is regulatory noise, inherent authority is even more
suspect.
C.

Consent

One might argue that a condition requires no judicial authority because the
condition can always be declined by the party faced with the condition. This
argument would emphasize that, for example, a deposing party seeking
additional discovery by way of motion would have a choice: proceed with the
deposition under the prescribed conditions (e.g., paying their adversary's
additional attorney's fees) or abandon the motion. Therefore, if the party
accepted the condition, the court does not require any authority to impose or
induce the condition. In other words, the y-plane is introduced as a function of
party autonomy. Because consent may not be voluntary in these contexts,
inducing conditions without institutional authority makes consent a dubious
source of authority.
Consent is valid only if it is not coerced. Judges enjoy significant leverage
over the parties in the context of a pending motion, and thus can extract
concessions that may be only nominally voluntary. Moving parties who accept
conditions would likely do so because the alternative to the condition is that
their motion will be denied outright.' 8 ' From this perspective, the conditional
order looks like an offer most movants would be silly to refuse. For this reason,

180. Id. at 64 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
181. Of course, for nonmoving parties who "accept" conditional denials the threat is that their
adversary's motion will be granted in full.
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But acceptance here is a
most conditional offers probably are "accepted."
182
product of the court's power, not its authority.
Consider this simple nonlegal example. A student asks a former professor
to accompany her to lunch. The professor responds that she will join on the
condition that the student pay. The professor has no authorityto require that the
student pay. 183 Yet, the circumstances present the opportunity for the professor
to assert power that could effect that result. 184 The conditional offer may be
"accepted" by the student, but the use of power without authority may have
been exploited. The use of power is a form of arm-twisting that casts doubt on
the voluntariness of that consent.
In the judicial context, the situation is even more troubling since the
exercise of judicial power is not only the exercise of power without authority, but
also a failure to exercise delegated authority. By introducing a condition that a
court is not authorized to induce, the judge avoids (and the movant is denied) an
up or down determination on the motion itself. Passing judgment on the motion
is a part of the judicial function that the judge should not escape; judicial inaction
is not within the judge's discretion. 8 5 By granting or denying the motion with
conditions, the judge is, in some sense, ruling on a motion that the parties did not
file. More importantly, it is not ruling on the motion that one of the parties did
file. Even if consenting to the conditional order, the movant has not consented to
not having a ruling on her motion.
Moreover, consent is a dubious basis because conditional orders may also
not even provide a meaningful opportunity to reject the offer. If a motion for
additional discovery is granted on the condition that the defendant pay the
additional attorney's fees associated with that additional discovery, then the
movant can reject the conditional grant by simply not engaging in the additional
discovery. But consider an order dismissing for lack of proper venue where the
order is conditioned on the waiver of a defendant's statute of limitations defense
if the case is refiled elsewhere. If the defendant finds these conditions
unacceptable, she cannot simply abandon the motion. Of course, the defendant
could move to withdraw her ("successful") motion or move to vacate the
judgment that was entered on his motion, but either approach would require
further litigation and also the court's permission. 86 The failure to take these
affirmative steps-which would also involve returning the partial victory for the

182. See generally Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 3, 19-25 (1976) (discussing necessity of distinction to prevent "endless
confusion" on questions of legitimacy).
183. Authority is a form of leverage generated by a demonstrably valid right or justification.
184. See Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information

Age, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 81, 86-88 (1998) (distinguishing between "hard" power exercised through
threats and rewards and "soft" power exercised through persuasion). See generally STEVEN LUKES,
POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 9 (1974) (arguing power is "ineradicably evaluative and 'essentially

contested' on the one hand; and empirically applicable on the other" (footnote omitted)).
185. VILA, supra note 16, at 10; David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion,60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543,577-78 (1985).
186. The withdrawal of a motion ordinarily would require the court's permission.
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18 7
chance at a complete victory-is an unfamiliar foundation for consent.
Deriving meaningful consent in the context of a conditional denial can be even
88
more problematic.

V.

CONDITIONS IN CONTEXT

The mismatch between the form and practice of conditional orders is
illustrative of a broader jurisprudential phenomenon. This Part uses a wide-angle
lens to examine conditional orders within this larger context.
Conditional orders enable a more individualized justice. Germane
conditions can facilitate creative outcomes tailored to the unique circumstances
of the case presented."8 9 Fairness conditions can minimize prejudice, protect
vulnerable parties, and deliver just results in each application of a uniform
rule. 190 And efficiency conditions can help assure that justice in a particular case
is not delayed. 191 Whether the flexibility and tailoring is used constructively or
destructively,192 conditions enable judges to adapt to the circumstances
presented and to customize their order.
Profound respect for individualized justice is part of the tremendous legacy
of equity. For centuries the Anglo-American legal system administered justice
through separate systems of law and equity. The law courts ensured uniformity
and predictability, while courts in equity tailored the substance and procedure to
the exigencies of each case. 193 Within a merged system of law and equity, the

187. To bring these issues into further relief, consider the conditional denial of a motion. Imagine
that the motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens is denied on the condition that the
litigation will proceed according to a timetable that is more convenient for the defendants. Is anything
short of an "objection" going to constitute "consent"? Again, the rational act of risk aversion is a
rather dubious foundation for consent.
188. For example, a court might deny a motion to intervene on the condition that the existing
parties allow robust participation by the putative intervenor as an amicus. Have the parties
"consented" if they fail then to voice their objection to the court's order? Must the parties seek
clarification of the court's intent regarding "robust participation"?
189. See supra section II.A for a discussion on germane conditions and where they may be
included.
190. See supra section II.B for a discussion on fairness conditions and where they may be
included.
191. See supra section II.C for a discussion on efficiency conditions and where they may be
included.
192. Conditions can unfairly exploit, prejudice, embarrass, bias, and deprive.
193. See Toledo, Ann Arbor & N. Mich. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 746, 751 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893)
("[T]he powers of a court of equity are as vast, and its processes and procedure as elastic, as all the
changing emergencies of increasingly complex ... relations and the protection of rights can demand."
(quoting Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 47 F. 15, 26 (C.C.D. Neb. 1891)));
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spirit of equity is reflected in many important doctrines, traditions, and practices.
Much of our contemporary substantive law, procedural law, and remedial law
originated in equity. 19 4 And, perhaps more subtly, the influence of equity is
195
reflected in the proliferation of broad principles as opposed to narrow rules,
196
variable standards of conduct, balancing tests, 197 leeways of precedent, 198 the
2°
acceptance of legal fictions, 199 and broad grants of discretionary authority.
CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 65 ("[W]hen the social needs demand one settlement rather than another,

there are times when we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the pursuit of
larger ends."); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EourrY JURISPRUDENCE: As ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 18, at 19 (photo. reprint 1972) (1836) (suggesting that courts of equity are
not strictly bound by precedent); Main, supra note 95, at 444 (discussing different approaches of law
and equity courts to legal problems).
194. See Main, supra note 26, at 329-30 (detailing equity's legacy in substantive and procedural
law).
195. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING

BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL

EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 158-62 (1991) (discussing
how rules limit the power of judges or other decision makers); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985) (providing examples of general legal pronouncements but
noting that such rules were so broad they required close examination of particularities of each case);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing for
adoption of general rules to be carried out as far as they may go in substantial furtherance of some
precise statutory or constitutional prescription).
196. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975) (writing that, often, rules promulgated under Uniform Commercial
Code are very broad and providing examples of said assertion); James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding
the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) (discussing expansion of
traditional concept of negligence in light of recent case law involving modern torts concepts such as
products liability, medical malpractice, and environmental protection); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing the
Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict
Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982) (writing that courts have moved away from

no-duty rules in negligence cases).
197. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987) (evaluating recent heightened use of balancing tests in judicial constitutional
reasoning); Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing,63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992) (arguing against
use of balancing tests in judicial proceedings); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on
the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1995) (providing thorough
examination of multiple doctrines employed by Supreme Court).
198. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss
It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990) (proposing and analyzing four different
models of precedent); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking
and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991) (examining operation of precedents in constitutional

law as stabilizing influence and as source of indeterminacy).
199. See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (extending traditional definitions of

legal fiction beyond "a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity" to
include "a false statement recognized as having utility"); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 1736 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864) (providing evolution of concept of legal fiction, as well as
examples of its use); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990) (outlining historical background of legal fictions and
arguing that doctrine of substituted judgment is dangerous legal fiction).
200. See ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 123-24 (1982) (discussing conflict between justice
and certainty and providing quotations regarding conflict); P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to
Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-
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Conditional orders can "adjust at one stroke the various interests of all parties
concerned '20 1 and, thus, are part of this tradition that favors the specific over the
general.
The apparent vitality of equity's legacy is intriguing in light of other
jurisprudential currents. After all, "judicial activism" is a boogeyman with whom
few choose to associate. 20 2 "For a generation now, candidates for the federal
bench have been expected to ritualistically disavow liberal activism. As a job
criterion, anti-activism is right up there with 'objectivity' in the minds of the
public, Congress and, now, the judiciary itself. '203 Judges overstep their
institutional boundary by forsaking "neutral principles,"' 20 4 creating policy in an
area that should be left for the legislature, 20 5 or by nullifying legislation. 20 6 The
20 7
judiciary is constituted only to interpret the laws, not to make or enforce them.

59 (1980) (outlining declining use of judicial discretion in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
followed by heightened use of overt judicial discretion in modern times).
201. Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence,6 AM. LAW SCH. REV. 10,
14 (1926) (explaining that equity courts have nearly unlimited power of enforcement).
202. See Richard Lavioe, Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle
Ground in American Jurisprudence,68 ALB. L. REV. 611, 611 n.1 for a listing of sources addressing
judicial activism in the context of elections.
203. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops ...It's Still Moving!,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 146 (2003) (citing DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES:
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 168-207 (1999)).

204. The neutral principle theory suggests that judges should decide cases based on general
principles that are consistently applied in similar cases. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Intepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-24 (1983);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1959).
205. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175-81
(1970) (arguing against judicial policymaking in most cases); Kenneth M. Holland, Introduction to
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) ("Judicial

activism comes into existence when courts do not confine themselves to adjudication of legal conflicts
but adventure to make social policies ...").
206. See C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 277-85 (1948) (stating that "most

perplexing" dilemma faced by Roosevelt Court was "determination of the degree of deference owed
by a liberal bench to the legislative will"); Bradley C. Canon, A Frameworkfor the Analysis of Judicial
Activism, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385, 385-86 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles

M. Lamb eds., 1982) ("Classic discussions of activism focused on the nullification of legislationusually liberal in nature-by conservative justices.").
207. The statement that judges should not make law has been something of a mantra for
conservatives since the Warren Court. For a listing of sources highlighting conservatives' statements,
see Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E.C-T: Respecting LegislativeJudgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C.
L. REV. 1253, 1254 n.1 (2000).
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And with regard to that particular task of interpretation, the "rule of law"
20 8
demands consistency and uniformity from the judiciary.
In many respects equity, then, appears to have lost its currency. The
210
structural reform injunction 209-a most ambitious use of judicial authority 211
awaits a eulogy.
Less ambitious forms of equitable relief, too, have been
curtailed: federal judges may not fashion new forms of equitable relief without
express congressional permission, and, even when permission has been granted,
that authority must be read narrowly by judges. 212 More and longer procedural
rules suggest regulatory creep. 213 And judges are unable to invoke equity or
equitable principles to supplant or override existing procedural rules: summary
jury trials, 214 mandatory alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), 215 settlement

208. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:Protecting Fundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2001)
("Central to the rule of law is the notion that judicial decision making must be marked by reason,
integrity, and constituency."); Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis: Solving the
Prisoners' Dilemma Within the Court,89 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1183-84 (2001) ("[Rjeplicability, stability
and consistency in application are values that the ideal of the rule of law is intended to serve.").
209. In this remedial regime, the trial judge became the central figure of the entire litigation
process by both determining liability and then fashioning a decree that would achieve the
constitutional or regulatory purpose. The injunctions ordered forward-looking, affirmative steps.
210. FlSS, supra note 18, at 18.
211. Myriam Gilles has discussed the matter in detail:
Evidence of the end is everywhere to be seen: On September 25, 2003, Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995) - a 26-year-old, $2 billion case seeking to desegregate Kansas City public
schools that reached the Supreme Court three times - finally ended. The case was closed
when plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal of the district court's ruling that the 35,000student district had met its final goal of closing the achievement gap between black and
white students. Although lawyers for the plaintiffs in Missouri v. Jenkins would not comment
on their reasons for dropping the appeal, many observers believe that the appeal was sure to
lose, especially given that both the Eight [sic] Circuit and the Supreme Court had expressed
exasperation that the case had dragged on for so long.
Gilles, supra note 203, at 144 n.10 (citations omitted).
212. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 234-45,256-58 (2003) (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204, 210-11 (2002); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 333 (1999)).
213. Main, supra note 95, at 482.
214. A summary jury trial is a trial of an action usually tried in one day, during which each party
presents the facts in a courtroom before a judge and jury for a verdict, usually by the end of the day. It
is an expedited means to have a jury evaluate a case on a binding or nonbonding basis. Judge Thomas
Lambros of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio created this procedure
in 1980 in "response to burgeoning court dockets." Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial: An
Effective Aid to Settlement, 77 JUDICATURE 6, 6-7 (1993). There has been resistance to the technique.
See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's
contempt finding for attorney who refused court-ordered summary jury trial); Hume v. M & C Mgmt.,
129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that court has no authority to use persons as summary
jurors); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some CautionaryObservations,53 U. Ct. L. REV. 366,368-89 (1986) (proposing economic
model to critique summary jury trials); Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the
Devil? A CurrentAssessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87, 115 (1990) (writing that study
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class actions, 2t 6 trial by statistics, 217 and creative contempt sanctions 218 are among
the many judicial innovations once held to be beyond the proper exercise of
219
judicial authority.
revealed lawyers found summary jury trials to be "a waste of time and money," and concluding that
summary jury trials do not "advance the quality ofjustice").
215. The judicial debate hinged primarily on the interpretation of an earlier version of Rule 16.
With noncoercive, permissive language, earlier Advisory Committee Notes acknowledged, if not
encouraged, judges to use ADR before trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1993). The
Notes did not clearly identify acceptable ADR methods. Courts rejecting mandatory ADR read Rule
16 and the accompanying notes as limiting the courts' express and inherent authority rather than
encouraging judicial innovation. Judges could urge litigants to use litigation alternatives but had no
power to compel them, these courts said. Amid disputes about the scope of judicial authority, demands
for faster and less expensive dispute resolution led to important statutory changes during the 1990s,
particularly the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which directed federal courts to draft plans for
streamlining case processing and resolution-including making ADR options available to litigants.
Rule 16 was also amended in 1993 to include provisions authorizing certain ADR referrals. Lucille M.
Ponte, Mandatory ADR Okay Under Revised F.R. C.P. 16, ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., Sept.
1995, at 115, 115.
216. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) (concluding that class
action certification that sought to achieve global settlement of current and future asbestos claims did
not satisfy Rule 23 requirement). This case resulted from an attempt to use a settlement class action to
resolve asbestos liability. This strategy began when all asbestos cases pending in federal courts were
enjoined pending issuance of a final order by District Judge Weiner in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Id. at 597, 599. Thereafter, settlement negotiations ensued between the asbestos bar, the
insurers, and the tort defendants. The Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR"), a facility formed by
certain defendants to settle asbestos claims, indicated that it would be willing to settle, but only if
future claims could be resolved as well. Id. at 601. The mechanism decided on to settle future claims
was a plaintiffs' class action with respect to all persons who had not yet filed an asbestos-related
lawsuit, a simultaneous settlement agreement, and a motion for class certification. The proposed class
would have comprised all persons who had been exposed to asbestos but who had not yet filed a
lawsuit. Id. at 601-03. Upon approval of the settlement, every member of the class would have been
barred from suing any company participating in the CCR. The district court certified the class, but the
Third Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 597, 603. The Supreme Court held that
the common issues of exposure to asbestos and not yet filing a complaint did not predominate over the
noncommon issues of type of asbestos exposure, type of disease, history of cigarette smoking, extent of
medical expenses, and so on. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25. It also held that the class representatives
could not fairly represent the class members because they had conflicted positions, based on their
diverse medical conditions and whether they had merely been exposed to asbestos or were in fact ill.
Id. at 625-26. Finally, notice to class members could probably not be given fairly because of the latent
nature of asbestos exposure, although that issue was not dispositive to the decision denying class
certification. Id at 628.
217. In Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), Judge Parker
certified a class of 3031 plaintiffs, all of whom had pending asbestos claims in the Eastern District of
Texas. Id. at 652. Settlements and dismissals reduced the class to 2298 claims. Five defendants that
manufactured asbestos products remained in the case at the time of trial. Judge Parker conducted
trials of these cases in three phases. In Phase I, a jury resolved all the issues that were common to the
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So has equity won? 22° Or lost? 22 ' It should not be a surprise that the

resolution of the law-equity tension would be complex. A unified system must
reconcile its commitment to equity-or fairness, which is probably the most

plaintiffs in the litigation, using procedures that Judge Parker had created and applied-and, most
importantly, the court of appeals had approved-in Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 109 F.R.D. 269
(E.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. The issues were
whether the asbestos products were defective and unreasonably dangerous, whether the warnings
were adequate, and whether the state of the art or fiber type defenses were viable. Id. The jury also
considered the issue of punitive damages and returned its Phase 1 verdict after about seven weeks of
trial. In addition to finding defective products, the jury found all five defendants to be grossly
negligent and, in response to a special interrogatory, found punitive damages multipliers ranging, for
the five defendants, from $1.50 to $3.00 for each $1.00 of actual damages. Id. at 657-58.
Phase II was designed for another jury to establish levels of exposure for various worksites and
crafts for defendants, including those defendants who settled, and to apportion percentages of
causation among the defendants. Id. at 653-54. As it turned out, defendants stipulated to findings on
all of the issues in Phase II. Id. at 654. Phase III dealt with damages. The court divided the cases into
five disease categories based on the plaintiffs' injury claims and selected a random sample of cases
from each disease category. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653. The categories, total numbers, and sample
sizes (in parentheses) were: mesothelioma - 32 (15), lung cancer - 186 (25), other cancer - 58 (20),
asbestosis - 1050 (50), and pleural disease - 972 (50). Id. Two new juries were impaneled, and they sat
together for five days to hear general medical testimony. They then sat separately and heard
testimony, group by group, on cases from each of the five injury groups and returned separate damage
verdicts for all the cases from each group over a period of approximately three months. Id. The juries
considered the groups in descending order of severity, starting with the mesothelioma cases. Linda S.
Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation:PostaggregativeProcedurein Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 475, 569 (1991). Judge Parker reviewed the verdicts and ordered remittiturs in thirtyfour pulmonary and pleural cases and in one mesothelioma case. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 657.
According to Professor Mullenix, in a case study of Cimino, Judge Parker "used almost every known
technique for aiding jury comprehension, including extensive pretrial and posttrial jury instructions,
jury notebooks, notetaking, interim summations, and witness photographs to refresh the jury's
memory." Mullenix, supra, at 572. Based on statistical evidence presented at a posttrial hearing, Judge
Parker found that the sample cases were in fact representative of the total population on all relevant
variables. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 664. Defendants did not challenge the statistical evidence. After
calculating the remittiturs and including cases with zero verdicts, the court applied the average damage
awards within each disease category to the remaining cases within that category. Id. at 658. The
plaintiffs waived any rights to individual damage determinations. The defendants objected on due
process grounds. The court rejected those challenges, saying that "unless this plan or some other
procedure that permits damages to be adjudicated in the aggregate is approved, these cases cannot be
tried." Id. at 666. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
unanimously held that the sampling procedures violated the Seventh Amendment and perhaps also
the Due Process Clause. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320-21 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying certification of class of 2990 due to
lack of common question of law or fact).
218. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of power of judges to hold
attorneys in contempt.

219. Of course, many of these innovations were later implemented through "proper" legislation.
See Main, supra note 26, at 365 (discussing comparative ease of enforcing alternative dispute
resolution judgments under Federal Arbitration Act).
220. Main, supra note 26, at 387 n.324.
221. See supra notes 202-19 and accompanying text for a discussion on the decline of equity's
influence in the law. See also Main, supra note 95, at 476-94 (writing about weakening of equity in
system that merged law and equity).
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important principle of jurisprudence 222-with the countervailing concern for
certainty-or uniformity, which may be the most basic principle of
jurisprudence. 223 The architects of the merger of law and equity did not
articulate precisely how a unified system could ensure uniformity yet also depart
from rigid rules to ensure fairness in each case. The form and practice of
conditional orders illustrate the tension and demonstrate the contemporary
compromise.
In form, there are an increasing number of instances where judges are
legislatively authorized to impose conditions.2 24 These codifications demonstrate
the systemic response to the demand for and the utility of conditions, to wit:
legislation. And indeed, codification is the likely response if useful but
unauthorized conditions are revealed by this Article or are identified elsewhere.
But legislative micromanagement can create mischief, of course, as rules drafted
for one situation then become a major source of inefficiency and unfairness in
unanticipated later situations; 225 this cycle repeats and the pathogens of strict law
spread.2 26 Importantly, however, this strain of regulatory creep may be different
these
because the legislation does not prescribe a particular result. Instead, 227
reforms lead to legislation that authorizes the exercise of judicial discretion.
Discretion is the expression of equity in our merged system. Judicial
discretion enables flexibility and ensures a more individualized justice, 228 and of

222. See ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 65 (Rothman Reprints 1969) (1924) ("Cases are
seldom exactly alike."); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 840 (1935) ("[E]very case presents a moral question to the court.").
223. Henry J. Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion,31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
224. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for examples of statutes that authorize
conditions.
225. See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943,
1944 (2000) ("[I]t may be better to leave judges free to adapt to the challenges without interference
from statutes and rules framed for the last war by Congress and the rulemaking committees.").
226. See generally Main, supra note 95, at 435-37 (discussing excess of cases generated by mass
tort litigation and effects of such surplus on legal system); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National
Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977) (cautioning that "hyperlexis," an explosion of law, has
caused tremendous harm to the "American body politic" and will continue to "incapacitate us in a
number of different ways").
227. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion on legislative authority as a source of judicial
conditions.
228. See F.W. MAITLAND, The Origin of Equity, in EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT
COMMON LAW 1, 4-7 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 4th prtg. 1916) (providing examples of
judicial discretion in fourteenth century); I STORY, supra note 193, § 18, at 19-20 (suggesting that
courts of equity should not be and are not restricted to precedents); Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years
of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171, 247-48 (1936) (concluding that equity has expanded
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course, this is entirely consistent with equity's protocol. 229 Yet, there is a
significant difference between equity and discretion: symbolically if not also
230
practically, discretion is exercised from within a zone or frame of possibilities.
A judge with discretion may have many options within that frame, but the
exercise of the judicial authority is fundamentally a choice. Equity is not similarly
constrained. 231 Indeed, the very purpose of a separate system of equity was to
offer relief from laws that did not-or could not-anticipate the situation
presented. 232 Equity presumed that laws were the product of human calculations
that were not always precise and of generalizations that were not always
general. 233 Equity offered an escape from rigid rules and empowered the judicial
imagination. 234 But this part of equity's protocol has faded in the unified system.
In form, then, that part of equity's protocol represented by judicial discretion has
been embraced and authorized,2 35 while the part of equity's protocol that
enabled and encouraged exercises of the judicial imagination has been curtailed
or rejected.236
In practice, however, the spirit of equity may innovate and create, whether
or not authorized. In this Article it has been demonstrated that judges are
imposing some conditions that may be facilitating creative, fair, and just
outcomes; yet those orders are not authorized by the standard sources of judicial
authority. 237 Such practices may be illustrative of other unauthorized exercises of
judicial authority that are tolerated if not also desired. For example, no matter

immensely in relation to American government and that it acts as an aid to "securing individual
rights").
229. See JOHN FREEMAN MITFORD, A TREATISE ON THE PLEADINGS IN SUITS IN THE COURT OF
CHANCERY BY ENGLISH BILL 110 (Samuel Tyler ed., Baker, Boorhis & Co. 1880) (noting that
administration of justice is goal of equity courts); 1 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203-06 (Thomas Payne 1792) (explaining differences in nature of equity

courts and courts of law).
230. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text for a description of metaphors for the term
discretion.
231. Roger L. Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform (pt. 1), 12 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 81, 89 (1934) (discussing ability of equity jurists to ignore precedent).

232. See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 24 (1952) (discussing origin of equity courts in English Court of Chancery); Severns,
supra note 231, at 84 (providing example of flexible nature of equity).
233. Main, supra note 95, at 434.
234. JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES
64 (photo. reprint 1969) (1913) (referring to equity as court "of indefinite powers and unrestricted
procedure"); JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 1-5 (12th ed. 1966) (suggesting that true and original
distinction between law and equity is one not between two conflicting bodies of rules, but between
system of judicial administration based on fixed rules and competing system governed solely by
judicial discretion).
235. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text for a discussion on the influence of equity in
modern law.
236. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of sentiments against an
"activist" judiciary.
237. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text for examples of conditions related to, but
probably not authorized by, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the political resistance and prevailing case law, judges must, or at least will, craft
creative, dramatic forms of injunctive relief to remedy certain wrongs. 238 And
regardless of the procedural infrastructure, judges with unusual demands of case
management will undoubtedly try to deviate from those rules. 239 Although some
exercises of this authority could be challenged or even reversed on appeal, others
may never be reviewed by an appellate court. Or appellate courts, too, may
recognize that some judicial actions are useful or beneficial even without formal
authority. For example, in many appeals in cases where conditional orders were
issued, neither the parties nor the court even questioned the propriety of the
240
condition.
Equity is a natural precursor to the law's innovations, and thus, the
241
dissonance between form and practice could be viewed in a very positive light.
Codified discretion is an inadequate substitute for equity. Equity can play an
important role in the growth of the law, and without that engine, "our law will be
moribund, or worse." 242 A merged system of law and equity could (and in fact
presently does) tolerate this practice through benign neglect. But accusations of
judicial activism are forthcoming. 243 And, more significantly, constitutional
mandates demand reform. Articles I and III of the Constitution clearly allocate
procedural rulemaking authority to Congress; the courts are the guests in this
realm. 244 Further, given the reasonable expectations of litigants, the Due Process
245
Clause may also demand closer adherence to the form.
But if the mismatch between form and practice cannot be ignored, then how
should it be rectified? Modifying the practice to match the existing form is
probably both undesirable and unworkable. Conditional orders are an extremely

238. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of reactions toward judicially
crafted remedies.
239. See supra Part II for a discussion of the four types of judicially crafted conditions.
240. See supra Part 1V.C for a suggestion that parties often consent to conditional orders without
challenging their propriety.
241. See GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 209 (1955)
(crediting Sir Henry Sumner Maine for famous dictum that there are three methods by which law has
sought to meet changing conditions: (1) fictions, (2) legislative amendment, and (3) equity); Melvin M.
Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REv. 345, 352-55 (1936) (listing equity as one of three
ways the law deals with societal changes).
242. Percy Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. CHI.L. REv. 741,749 (1934).
243. See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text for a discussion on the backlash against
judicial activism.
244. See supra Part IV.A for discussion of congressional authority to make procedural rules for
courts.

245. See supra note 180 and accompanying text for a discussion on how imposing conditions
would infringe on plaintiffs' due process rights.
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useful technique for finding intermediate and compromise solutions; eliminating
these options would be an unfortunate tack. Moreover, such an undertaking
might also be impossible since judges already impose or induce conditions in a
variety of circumstances where they lack the formal authority to do so; efforts to
educate trial and appellate judges about the limits of their authority could be
effective, but this seems unlikely.
If the practice will not or cannot be modified, then presumably the
mismatch can only be rectified by modifying the form to authorize the practice.
In other words, the form must give judges the authority to impose useful
conditions. This approach could be undertaken with more rules authorizing
conditions (and discretion). But as demonstrated by the status quo, and as
described in Part IV, the profoundly ironic consequence of rules that confer
discretion is that they may, in fact, ultimately reduce judicial discretion. By
delineating the boundaries of the authority to impose a condition, or by
codifying flexibility, the rule not only bounds judicial authority to those
particular reference points, but even worse, bounds judicial authority in other
contexts where the discretion or flexibility is not detailed. Legislative efforts
246
usurp the more robust role that inherent authority would otherwise perform.
The better approach, then, is not more rules, but fewer rules. More and
longer rules will never anticipate all of the eccentricities that fate or human
ingenuity are "virile enough to devise."2 47 My effort here is to urge a
commitment and return to more flexible rules of procedure that reflect the
rhetoric and common perception that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
all equity.2 48 Amendments that add the authority to condition or that purport to
give discretion perpetuate a cycle that leads to the creation of further procedural
insufficiencies that, in turn, require still more elaboration. That cycle must be
broken with broader rules that facilitate vigor and common sense and efficiency
and fairness in their application. Conditional orders offer a useful case study of a
paradox: rules that purport to authorize, may in fact constrain.

246. See supra Parts IV.A and IV.B for a discussion on legislative power over the court's
inherent authority.
247. Colin P. Campbell, The Court of Equity-A Theory of its Jurisdiction,15 GREEN BAG 108,
113 (1903).
248. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 970-82 (1987) (writing how equity was
primary influence when drafting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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